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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Background to the study 
The World Trade Organisation (WTO) is an international institution that aims to supervise and 
liberalise international trade and primarily deals with the regulation of trade between countries.1 It 
provides a platform where Member States meet in an attempt to negotiate and formalise trade 
agreements, and to solve trade related issues they encounter with each other through the Dispute 
Settlement Body.2 
Within the WTO, like the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) before it, decision 
making is ruled by two key characteristics of WTO jurisprudence: the requirement that decisions be 
made by means of consensus;3 and the single undertaking principle, which means that every item of 
the negotiation is part of a whole and indivisible package and cannot be agreed separately.4 The 
combination of these two elements means that ‘nothing is agreed until everything is agreed to by 
everyone’.5 
While it seems that the WTO is an organisation that establishes a sense of security and equality among 
Member Countries, it has over the years been criticised for its decision making process, particularly 
for its informal processes and politics (referred to as Green Room meetings) as well as the Member 
Countries that participate in those meetings.6 The Green Room discussions are small gatherings of 
representatives from up to 30 Member States hosted by the Director-General of the WTO, which 
intend to narrow down the issues that need to be taken to the wider membership for discussion and 
provide the basis for a consensus on critical negotiating issues that can be brought to the WTO 
membership as a whole.7 
                                                                
1 World Trade Organisation Understanding the WTO 5ed (2011) Geneva: World Trade Organisation Available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/tif_e.htm (Accessed 25 April 2014) 9. 
2 World Trade Organisation Understanding the WTO 5ed (2011) Geneva: World Trade Organisation Available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/tif_e.htm (Accessed 25 April 2014) 9. 
3 Jones K ‘Green Room Politics and the WTO’s Crisis of Representation’ (2009) 349. 
4 MacMillan E ‘Doha Decision making: Implications of the Consensus and Single Undertaking Principles for Developing Countries’ 
(2010) 1. 
5 World Trade Organisation Understanding the WTO 5ed (2011) Geneva: World Trade Organisation Available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/tif_e.htm (Accessed 25 April 2014) 108. 
6 Kenworthy J ‘Reforms of the WTO: Basic Issues and Concerns’ (2000) 2; Jones K ‘Green Room Politics and the WTO’s Crisis of 
Representation’ (2009) 349; Low P WTO Decision making for the Future (2011) Geneva: World Trade Organisation Available at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1833391 (Accessed 25 April 2014) 3. 
7 Kenworthy J ‘Reforms of the WTO: Basic Issues and Concerns’ (2000) 2; Low P WTO Decision making for the Future (2011) 
Geneva: World Trade Organisation Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1833391 (Accessed 25 April 2014) 3. 
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Hence, Green Room discussions are perceived by representatives of Developing Countries (DCs) and 
Least Developed Countries (LDCs) as unrepresentative and non-inclusive of their broader and more 
diverse interests and objectives. They have therefore been criticised because they tend to favour large 
and high income countries.8 For this reason, the Third World Network9 has called the WTO ‘the most 
non-transparent of international organisations’, because ‘the vast majority of DCs have very little real 
say in the WTO system’.10 
The Doha Round or Doha Development Agenda (DDA) is the ninth Round of multilateral trade 
negotiations to be carried out since the end of World War II. The Round was launched in Doha, Qatar, 
in November 2001, at the WTO’s fourth Ministerial Conference (MC), where ministers provided a 
mandate for negotiations on a wide range of subjects and work in on-going WTO committees.11 
The Doha Round stalled in November 2011, after 10 years of talks, in spite of all official efforts made 
by many countries and by nearly all the eminent trade scholars and experts of today.12 The trade 
negotiations were scheduled to conclude at the end of 2005, but that did not happen, despite urgent 
and repeated gatherings of dignitaries and experts.13 
After unsuccessful attempts to re-launch the negotiations at the 2009 and 2011 MCs, the meeting in 
Bali represents a tremendous opportunity to bring WTO Members back to the negotiation table.14 
Therefore, this Research Paper will attempt to look at the effect of the Bali Accord on the DDA, and 
will ascertain whether the Accord effectively takes into account the broader and more diverse interests 
of DCs and LDCs. 
 
                                                                
8 Jones K ‘Green Room Politics and the WTO’s Crisis of Representation’ (2009) 349; Low P WTO Decision making for the Future 
(2011) Geneva: World Trade Organisation Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1833391 (Accessed 25 April 2014) 4; Alqadhafi SAI 
Reforming the WTO: Toward more Democratic Governance and Decision making (2007) 7. 
9 The Third World Network is an independent non-profit international network of organisations and individuals involved in issues 
relating to development, the Third World and North- South issues. Its objectives are to conduct research on economic, social and 
environmental issues pertaining to the South; to publish books and magazines; to organize and participate in seminars; and to 
provide a platform representing broadly Southern interests and perspectives at international forums, such as UN conferences and 
processes. 
10 Quoted in Jones K ‘Green Room Politics and the WTO’s Crisis of Representation’ (2009) 2. 
11 http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/dda_e.htm (Accessed 25 April 2014). 
12 Bhagwati J ‘Why Doha Round Failed’ (2009) Available at http://economistonline.muogao.com/2008/08/bhagwati-why-doha-round-
failed.html (Accessed 25 April 2014) 1. 
13 Levy P ‘Alternatives to Consensus at the WTO’ (2010) Available http://www.voxeu.org/article/alternatives-consensus-wto 
(Accessed on 8 May 2014) 1. 
14 Helble M & Wignaraja G ‘Will the WTO Bali Conference Advance the Doha Round and Asia?’ (2013) Available at 
http://www.voxeu.org/article/what-prospects-wto-deal-bali(Accessed 11 May 2014). 
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1.2. Problem statement 
The problem that this Research Paper is aiming to examine is whether the Bali Agreement has 
successfully impacted on the consensus pitfalls and the Doha Round stalemate as shown in the 
background to the study (part 1 above). 
 
1.3.  Research question 
The role of DCs and LDCs in the arena of global trade has increased dramatically and constitutes a 
matter of great relevance. The main test of the Doha Round was to reform the multilateral trading 
system in order to have a level playing field that will reflect a new balance of power, interests, and 
views about the necessary steps to be taken by the WTO as an institution.15 In the past few years, new 
economic actors, mostly DCs, have emerged in the international debate and have shifted the 
movement of rebalancing power and wealth that puts an end to the domination of developed countries 
over the rest of the world. 
In order to effectively explore the growing influence of emerging economies in the multilateral 
trading system and in the global economy, the following research questions are asked: 
1. What are the possible reasons for the impasse in the Doha Round of negotiations? 
2. Did the Bali Package effectively resolve the stalemate or move the Doha Round forward?  
3. Does the Bali Package effectively represent and take into account the interests of DCs and 
LDCs? 
4. What other alternatives should Member States use in an attempt to make the decision making 
within the WTO more effective and to restore the credibility of the multilateral trading 
system? 
 
1.4. Argument  
The WTO is a Member driven organisation that strives to build consensus on key decisions and also 
provides assistance to DCs and LDCs in transition to adjust to WTO rules and disciplines. To gain 
consensus among the WTO's diverse membership of 161 countries and territories requires flexibility, 
                                                                
15 Laidi Z ‘The BRICS Against the West?’ (2011) CERI Strategy Papers Available at http://spire.sciences-
po.fr/hdl:/2441/eu4vqp9ompqllr09i4icocu28/resources/n11-112011.pdf (Accessed on 24 April 2014). 
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both in the content of any final agreement and in the method by which these agreements are decided.16 
However, this flexibility sometimes results in negotiations taking a long time to be concluded and for 
consensus to be reached. At first glance, it seems that the requirement for consensus may complicate 
decision- making as it allows any Member to exercise a form of veto. 
The multilateral trading rules are driven by several key principles such as non-discrimination, 
transparency and consensus. But one size does not fit all at the WTO, agreements on tariff levels and 
other obligations for instance are tailored in order to take into account the sensitivities of Member 
Countries. 17 Thus, it is one of the reasons why an agreement is so complex to reach within the WTO. 
After the deadlock in the DDA talks in Geneva, government officials and the WTO Secretariat are 
picking up the pieces so as to save the Doha negotiations or at least salvage some parts of it.18 In 
December 2013, ministers of trade from 160 countries have reached an unprecedented deal intended 
to boost global trade. The Bali Package as it is known, is a trade agreement resulting from the ninth 
MC of the WTO held in Bali, Indonesia.19 
The Bali Package is a three part agreement of the DDA that covers Trade Facilitation (TF), 
agriculture, and development issues. It is aimed at lowering global trade barriers and is the first 
comprehensive agreement reached through the WTO that is approved by all its Members.20 
Almost two years have passed since Member States agreed upon the Bali Package in December 2013. 
Despite the political will that yielded the first successful multilateral trade agreement under the DDA, 
the WTO has struggled greatly to process the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA), which is the key 
element of the Bali Package, into formal adoption and implementation.21 Eventually, the TFA was 
successfully adopted in November 2014.22 
It is submitted that the concepts of consensus and the single undertaking and their practical 
implications that require all Members, large or small, to participate in all the WTO negotiations and 
                                                                
16 VanGrasstek C The History and Future of the World Trade Organisation (2013) Available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/historywto_e.pdf (Accessed 25 April 2014) 209. 
17 Kenworthy J ‘Reforms of the WTO: Basic Issues and Concerns’ (2000) 2. 
18 Khor M ‘Why WTO Talks Collapsed’ (2008) Third World Network Available at 
http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/wto.info/twninfo20080805.htm (Accessed 11 May 2014) 2. 
19 Walker A ‘WTO Agrees Global Trade Deal Worth $1tn’ Available at http://www.bbc.com/news/business-25274889 (Accessed 11 
May 2014) 1. 
20 Willenbockel D ‘The WTO Bali Deal: ‘Doha Lite and Decaffeinated’ (2013) Available at 
http://www.globalisationanddevelopment.com/2013/12/the-wto-bali-deal-doha-lite-and.html(Accessed 11 May 2014) 1. 
21 Laroski J ‘Roadblocks to Bali package implementation remain as summer deadline passes without a clear path forward’ (2014) 1; 
Bridges Weekly (ed) ‘WTO trade facilitation deal in limbo as deadline passes without resolution’ (2014) 1, Bridges Weekly (ed) ‘WTO 
chief warns of potential "freezing effect" as TFA, food stockholding deadlock persists’ (2014) 1; Bridges Weekly (ed) ‘Obama, Modi 
highlight TFA impasse concerns, call for “urgent” WTO consultations’ (2014) 1; Bridges Weekly (ed) ‘New stage of consultations 
begins as WTO deadlock persists’ (2014) 1. 
22 Wolfe R ‘First Diagnose, Then Treat: What Ails the Doha Round?’ (2015) 23. 
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undertake commitments, are among the causes.23 Although they both constitute a rampart against 
interference by some, they remain nevertheless difficult to put into operation without everyone 
agreeing to move at the speed of the slowest Member, or without long and complicated negotiations 
between all Members.24 
Thus, this is a clear indication that the Doha Round shows a rising awareness of the dominance of 
DCs and LDCs in recent years.25 However, since the WTO commitment to deliver the promised pro-
development changes, the Doha has been unsuccessful in engaging on the interests DCs and LDCs in 
the past decade.26 In this regard, this Research Paper will attempt to answer the research questions 
with a particular emphasis being placed on the concerns of these groups of countries and whether or 
not the Bali Package successfully addresses them. 
 
1.5.  Significance of the study  
Although there is extensive literature on the stalemate in the current Doha Round of negotiation, very 
little in the literature exists with regard to the Bali Accord and its possible impact on the Doha Round. 
There is hardly any academic work which comprehensively deals with the effect of the Bali Accord 
on the Doha Round stalemate due to the novelty and the uniqueness of the topic. Hence, this study is 
significant because it seeks to provide an answer to the crucial question of the impact of the Bali 
Accord on the Doha Round stalemate. The Research Paper would serve as a contribution to the 
general jurisprudence of international trade law and as a point of academic reference for students and 
researchers. 
Moreover, this study is significant as it will attempt to look broadly at the unique challenges and 
interests of the emerging countries within the WTO, which currently constitute two-thirds of the 
WTO's membership.27 The political interests of the global economy powers have been shelved by 
                                                                
23 Bhagwati J & Sutherland ‘The Doha Round: Setting a Deadline, Defining a Final Deal’ (2011) Available at 
http://www.number10.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/doha-round-jan-2011.pdf (Accessed on 23 April 2014). 
24 Bhagwati J & Sutherland ‘The Doha Round: Setting a Deadline, Defining a Final Deal’ (2011) Available at 
http://www.number10.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/doha-round-jan-2011.pdf (Accessed on 23 April 2014). 
25 Laidi Z ‘The BRICS Against the West?’ (2011) CERI Strategy Papers Available at http://spire.sciences-
po.fr/hdl:/2441/eu4vqp9ompqllr09i4icocu28/resources/n11-112011.pdf (Accessed on 24 April 2014). 
26 Bhagwati J ‘Doha Round: Failure of Talks Means World Lost Gains That a Successful Treaty Would Have Brought’ Available at 
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-06-01/news/31959341_1_ptas-wto-multilateral-trade (Accessed on 23 April 2014) 
1. 
27 Amrita N & Tussie D ‘The G20 at the Cancun Ministerial: Developing Countries and their Evolving in the WTO’ (2004) 947. 
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DCs. In 1995, the world went through major geopolitical changes28 and has witnessed the rise of new 
actors that have asserted their own role in shaping the world’s political economy.29 
This study is also significant as it is believed that important lessons can be drawn from the Bali 
Accord that would effectively improve the WTO’s decision making, achieve democratic governance, 
protect the rights of marginalised countries within the WTO, and rebalance the multilateral trading 
system. 
 
1.6.  Research methodology  
This research will be conducted by desktop research only. The method employed in this research will 
require the use of international trade law and trade policies. It will involve a critical analysis of 
provisions of the trade Agreement signed during the MC in Bali, referred to as the Bali Package.  
It will also be conducted by critical perusal the legal publications, such as case Law, legislation, peer 
reviewed journal articles, academic books, government policy papers, reports from international trade 
conventions, newspapers, and online publications. 
 
1.7.  Overview of chapters 
This Research Paper is divided into five chapters, including this introductory chapter, which poses 
straightforward research questions and defines the topic to be discussed. 
Chapter Two briefly examines the background of the WTO. It commences by discussing the main 
functions of the WTO. Then, it explores the decision making processes and the governance structures 
of the WTO, with the aim of placing the rationale behind choosing the ‘one Member, one vote’ and 
the single undertaking principles into context, followed by a short conclusion. 
Chapter Three reviews the Doha Round of negotiations and looks at the possible reasons for the 
stalemate in the current Round. In this regard, it first examines the emergence of major DCs in the 
field of world trade. It then explores the nature and scope of consensus and the single undertaking 
                                                                
28At the geopolitical level, the 1990s decade was marked by the collapse of the Soviet Bloc, the end of the Cold War and the 
collapse of the Berlin wall, which opened the way for the reunification of Germany and the whole of Europe. These events 
accelerated the decline of the communist ideology and saw a large number of countries convert to liberalism. The People’s Republic 
of China has opened to international trade and foreign investment. This redefinition of the balance of power leads to the emergence 
of globalisation, and the introduction of a new world economic order. 
29 Ikenberry GJ ‘The Future of the Liberal World Order: Internationalism after America’ (2011) 56. 
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with the aim to expose their pitfalls. It finally looks at the intrinsic difficulties of finding agreement 
among all Member States and is followed by a short conclusion. 
Chapter Four assesses the impact of the Bali Package on the decision making of the WTO, whether 
and how it comes to the rescue of the Doha Round. It commences the discussion by exploring the 
main issues of concern in Bali in order to obtain a balanced trade package. This is followed by an 
analysis of how far the Bali Agreement addresses the DCs’ and LDCs’ interests identified in Chapter 
Two. Then it looks at the future of the WTO’s multilateral trading system, and particularly points out 
the rationale behind rebalancing the world trading system, followed by a short conclusion.  
Chapter Five is the final chapter of the Research Paper. It ends the journey by answering the research 
questions formulated, whilst presenting the conclusions and addressing some recommendations on 
how to make the decision making within the WTO more effective. 
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CHAPTER TWO: THE DECISION MAKING PROCEDURES AND THE GOVERNING 
STRUCTURES IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION 
This chapter describes the governing structures and the different decision making processes of the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the Doha Round of multilateral negotiations, followed by a 
short conclusion. 
 
2.1. The World Trade Organisation: a Member driven organisation 
The WTO officially came into force on 1 January 1995 under the Marrakech Agreement, replacing 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) that was established in 1947. Nevertheless, in 
spite of the seemingly recent inception of the WTO, its institutional history has existed for over six 
decades now, as the rules of the international trading system have been applied since the GATT era.30 
However, it was with the birth of the WTO that the rules of international trade were extended to 
include a number of areas that were previously outside the GATT system, most notably agriculture, 
textiles, trade in services and Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs). The changes gave the WTO much 
more power to influence people’s lives than the GATT had ever had, especially in emerging 
economies.31 
As a consequence, the creation of the WTO brought a body where Member Countries meet in an 
attempt to sort out their differences with regards to trade. The WTO has several core functions. In the 
broadest of terms, the primary functions of the WTO include: 
‘facilitating the implementation and operation of the Multilateral Trade Agreements, 
providing a forum for negotiations, administering the Dispute Settlement Mechanism, 
providing multilateral surveillance of trade policies, and cooperating with the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to achieve greater coherence in global 
economic policymaking’.32 
                                                                
30 Hoekman BM & Kostecki MM The Political Economy of the World Trading System: the WTO and Beyond 3 ed (2009) 57; Narlikar 
A, Daunton M & Stern RM ‘Introduction’ in Narlikar A, Daunton M & Stern RM (eds) The Oxford Handbook on the World Trade 
Organisation (2012) 1; World Trade Organisation (ed) Understanding the WTO 5ed (2011) 10. 
31 Hoekman BM & Kostecki MM The Political Economy of the World Trading System: the WTO and Beyond 3 ed (2009) 58. 
32 Refer to Article III of the WTO Agreement; Hoekman BM & Kostecki MM The Political Economy of the World Trading System: the 
WTO and Beyond 3 ed (2009) 59; Lal Das B The WTO and the Multilateral Trading System: Past, Present and Future (2003) 34; 
World Trade Organisation (ed) Understanding the WTO 5ed (2011) 9; VanGrasstek C The History and Future of the World Trade 
Organisation (2013). 
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Other than that,33 its overriding purpose is to help trade flow as freely and smoothly as possible 
providing that there are no disastrous side-effects.34 The WTO is described as a Member driven 
organisation, which implies that it is an institution that is run by its Members. As such, it differs 
considerably from the international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF, whose 
decisions are based on weighted voting and where power is delegated to a board of directors or the 
organisation’s head.35 
The WTO is administered by a certain number of decision making structures, the most prominent 
being the MC, the General Council (GC), and the Specialised Councils (SCs). These structures will 
be discussed in the following sections. 
 
2.2. The decision making structures of the World Trade Organisation 
Decision making relates to how a decision is arrived at in MCs, in the GC, and in the subordinate 
bodies of the WTO. All major decisions are made by the membership as a whole, either by ministers 
or by their ambassadors or delegates.36  
 
2.2.1. The Ministerial Conference (MC) 
The MC is the supreme and principal decision making body of the WTO. It usually convenes at least 
once every two years.37 The MC is composed of minister level representatives (usually ministers of 
trade) of all Members States and has decision making powers on all matters under any of the WTO 
multilateral agreements. The inaugural MC was held in Singapore in 1996 and the most recent MC, 
which is the focus of this Research Paper, was held in Bali, Indonesia, in 2013.38 The next MC will, 
                                                                
33 Due to the conciseness of this Research Paper, the history, functions and structure of the WTO will be explored briefly. For further 
reading on this section, refer to Hoekman BM & Kostecki MM The Political Economy of the World Trading System: the WTO and 
Beyond 3 ed (2009); VanGrasstek C The History and Future of the World Trade Organisation (2013) and World Trade Organisation 
(ed) Understanding the WTO 5ed (2011). 
34 World Trade Organisation (ed) Understanding the WTO 5ed (2011) 10. 
35 Hoekman BM & Kostecki MM The Political Economy of the World Trading System: the WTO and Beyond 3 ed (2009) 65; Nguyen 
T, Nguyen Q & Pham P ‘Decision making by Consensus in the WTO’ (2012) 4; Rolland SE Development at the World Trade 
Organisation 1 ed (2012) 215. 
36 World Trade Organisation (ed) Understanding the WTO 5ed (2011) 108. 
37 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (ed) Dispute Settlement of the World Trade Organisation: Overview 
(2003).14; Lal Das B The WTO and the Multilateral Trading System: Past, Present and Future (2003) 13; Hoekman BM & Kostecki 
MM The Political Economy of the World Trading System: the WTO and Beyond 3 ed (2009) 59. 
38 https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/minist_e.htm (Accessed 19 March 2015). 
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for the first time take place on African soil, and will be held in Nairobi, Kenya, from 15 to 18 
December 2015.39 
 
2.2.2. The General Council (CG) 
The General Council (GC) is composed of ambassador level representatives representing all WTO 
Members and normally meets once every two months at the WTO headquarters in Geneva.40 The GC 
is responsible for the continuing, day-to-day management of the WTO and its many activities; it also 
meets in the guise of the Trade Policy Review Body and the Dispute Settlement Body.41 In between 
sessions of the MC, the GC exercises the full powers of the MC. In addition to the powers of the MC, 
it also carries out a few functions specifically assigned to it. The GC is responsible for the adoption 
of the annual budget and the financial regulations.42 
 
2.2.3. The Specialised Councils (SC) 
Below the GC are three more councils, also called SC, each handling a different area of trade and 
reporting directly to the GC. These are: the Council for Trade in Goods (Goods Council), the Council 
for Trade in Services (Services Council) and the Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS Council). 43 Representation at all three levels is open to all Members of the 
WTO. The SCs also play an important role in the procedure for the adoption of waivers and the 
amendment procedure.44 
Apart from the three SCs, there are a number of committees and working groups that assist the MC 
and the GC in carrying out their functions. The scope of their activities is smaller, but they still consist 
of all WTO Members. They cover issues such as trade and development, the environment, regional 
trading arrangements, and administrative issues.45 
                                                                
39 https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/minist_e.htm (Accessed 19 March 2015). 
40 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (ed) Dispute Settlement of the World Trade Organisation: Overview 
(2003).18. 
41 Nguyen T, Nguyen Q & Pham P ‘Decision making by Consensus in the WTO’ (2012) 4. 
42 Article VII:1-3 of the WTO Agreement. 
43 Nguyen T, Nguyen Q & Pham P ‘Decision making by Consensus in the WTO’ (2012) 4; United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (ed) Dispute Settlement of the World Trade Organisation: Overview (2003).19; World Trade Organisation (ed) 
Understanding the WTO 5ed (2011) 109; Hoekman BM & Kostecki MM The Political Economy of the World Trading System: the 
WTO and Beyond 3 ed (2009) 63. 
44 Article IX:3(b) and Article X:1 of the WTO Agreement. 
45 Refer to Article IV:6 of the WTO Agreement; World Trade Organisation (ed) Understanding the WTO 5ed (2011) 109; United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (ed) Dispute Settlement of the World Trade Organisation: Overview (2003).19. 
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It is important to note that on top of the aforementioned decision making bodies, the WTO follows a 
certain number of procedures when deciding the fate of the world multilateral negotiations. These 
decision making processes will be discussed below. 
 
2.3. The different procedures for reaching a decision within the World 
Trade Organisation 
The procedures of decision making are among the most important methods of functioning against 
which the legitimacy of one institution may be rated. It is because they show how the organisation 
treats its Members and thereby fulfils the first and minimal level of accountability.46 The WTO is a 
‘one Member, one vote’ organisation and in this regard, its decision making is concentrated around 
four key principles namely, the consensus rule, the ‘one Member, one vote’, the Member driven 
character and the importance of informal processes.47 These principles will be discussed in the 
subsequent sections. 
 
2.3.1. The consensus principle 
The principle of consensus is the single most important rule in the decision making processes of the 
multilateral system48 and hence remains the modus operandi of the WTO,49 in other words the 
institution is based on bargaining and consultation.50 
                                                                
46 Nguyen T, Nguyen Q & Pham P ‘Decision making by Consensus in the WTO’ (2012) 4. 
47 Liang M ‘Evolution of the WTO Decision making Process’ (2005) 125; Hoekman B ‘Proposals for WTO Reform: A Synthesis and 
Assessment’ in Narlikar A, Daunton M & Stern RM (eds) The Oxford Handbook on the World Trade Organisation (2012) 746. 
48 Article IX: 1 of the WTO Agreement provides: “The WTO shall continue the practice of decision making by consensus followed 
under GATT 1947. Except as otherwise provided, where a decision cannot be arrived at by consensus, the matter at issue shall be 
decided by voting. At meetings of the Ministerial Conference and the General Council, each Member of the WTO shall have one 
vote. […] Decisions of the Ministerial Conference and the General Council shall be taken by a majority of the votes cast, unless 
otherwise provided in this Agreement or in the relevant Multilateral Trade Agreement”. 
49 Dube M The Way Forward for the WTO: Reforming the Decision making Process (2012) 13; Hoekman BM & Kostecki MM The 
Political Economy of the World Trading System: the WTO and Beyond 3 ed (2009) 65; Hoekman B ‘Proposals for WTO Reform: A 
Synthesis and Assessment’ in Narlikar A, Daunton M & Stern RM (eds) The Oxford Handbook on the World Trade Organisation 
(2012) 746; Rolland SE Development at the World Trade Organisation 1 ed (2012) 214; Low P WTO Decision making for the Future 
(2011) 3; MacMillan E ‘Doha Decision making: Implications of the Consensus and Single Undertaking Principles for Developing 
Countries’ (2010) 1; VanGrasstek C The History and Future of the World Trade Organisation (2013) 209. 
50 Hoekman BM & Kostecki MM The Political Economy of the World Trading System: the WTO and Beyond 3 ed (2009) 65. 
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A WTO body may decide by consensus on a matter submitted for its consideration, if none of the 
Members present at the meeting formally objects to the proposed decision when it is taken.51 In other 
words, unless a Member State explicitly rejects a proposed decision, that decision is taken.52 
The origins of decision making by consensus can be traced as far back as in the GATT system. Even 
in situations where the GATT rules provided for a formal vote such as granting of waivers, a 
consensus text would first be reached through negotiation and consultations before the formal vote 
was held.53 Consensus was facilitated by a GATT tradition, namely, ‘not to allow progress to be 
frustrated by one party’s obstinacy, unless it happened to be one of the major trading powers.’54 
It is important to distinguish consensus in the WTO from unanimity. Unanimity refers to complete 
and explicit agreement by everyone. Consensus on the other hand can be reached provided that no 
objections are raised to a decision, but also relates to the process of reaching such agreement.55  
The multilateral trading system has been acknowledged as a prominent part of the architecture of 
global governance since the inception of both the GATT and the WTO. Compared to its Bretton 
Woods counterparts, the WTO has been relatively more successful in building a better decision 
making system that is based on consensus.56  
In light of the aforesaid, it is suggested that consensus has generally received more praise than censure 
from experts, even though such praise is at times weak. Ehlermann and Ehring asserted that it is 
beneficial, because a consensus based decision will tend to enjoy broad support; it also means that no 
one loses face because implementation of such decision will be stimulated by the collaboration of all 
participants irrespective of their size and power; and consensus is the best out of all possible decision 
making options and processes due to the fact that developed countries would tend to fear being 
outvoted and DCs would fear being presented with done deals.57  
According to the International Law Association, consensus ‘protects the quality and inclusiveness of 
decision making and gives each WTO Member a veto power, limited by joint political pressures, 
which is otherwise not present in the case of voting’. 58 
                                                                
51 Footnote 1 to Article IX of the WTO Agreement. 
52 Should consensus not be achieved, then Article IX: 1 of the WTO Agreement provides for voting on a ‘one Member, one vote’ 
basis. Under the normal procedure, decisions are then taken by a majority of the votes cast. As under the old GATT, however, it is 
very exceptional for WTO bodies to arrive at a vote. See Hoekman BM & Kostecki MM The Political Economy of the World Trading 
System: the WTO and Beyond 3 ed (2009) 66. 
53 Nguyen T, Nguyen Q & Pham P ‘Decision making by Consensus in the WTO’ (2012) 4. 
54 Hoekman BM & Kostecki MM The Political Economy of the World Trading System: the WTO and Beyond 3 ed (2009) 66. 
55 Low P WTO Decision making for the Future (2011) 3. 
56 Ismail F Reforming the World Trade Organisation: Developing Countries in the Doha Round (2009) 128; Ismail F Mainstreaming 
Development in the WTO: Developing Countries in the Doha Round (2007) 22. 
57 Quoted in Dube M The Way Forward for the WTO: Reforming the Decision making Process (2012) 17. 
58 Quoted in VanGrasstek C The History and Future of the World Trade Organisation (2013) 212. 
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However, despite the advantages brought about by consensus, the conduct of negotiations leading to 
such decision making (referred to as informal consultations), which will be discussed in great detail 
in the forthcoming sections, has been vehemently criticised in much of the late GATT and the WTO 
to the extent that they are considered as plausible reasons for the stalemate in the current Round of 
negotiations. However, Ambassador John Weekes, former President of the WTO General Council, 
makes a graceful statement in support of consensus when he states: 
‘There is some criticism that the consensus rule in the WTO makes progress difficult. 
However, it is hard to imagine how to reach agreement on a collective domestic reform 
agenda other than by consensus. Agreements entered into voluntarily will be much more 
durable and, importantly, easier to implement. Although the consensus system may retard 
progress, it is the best theoretical approach, since other systems would only further 
disadvantage DCs.’ 59 
In light of the aforesaid, since most decisions within the WTO are virtually made by means of 
consensus among all Members, it is therefore submitted that consensus remains the most 
appropriate way of reaching an agreement at the WTO. Although the requirement for consensus 
may complicate decision making as it allows any Member to exercise a form of veto, it still 
appears the most suitable approach, as compared to qualified majority voting or the weighted 
voting systems that are prevalent in other international institutions and would be more 
detrimental to the emerging countries. 
 
2.3.2. The concept of the single undertaking 
The single undertaking plays a key role in the WTO negotiation structure and is closely related to 
consensus. In terms of this principle, nothing is agreed upon until all Members agree to all parts of 
the negotiations, thus resulting in a single, whole and indivisible package of multilateral commitments 
that cannot be agreed separately.60 Hoekman argues that both consensus and the single undertaking 
are practices rather than formal rules.61 
                                                                
59 Alqadhafi SAI Reforming the WTO: Toward more Democratic Governance and Decision making (2007) 9-10; Alqadhafi SAI The 
Role of Civil Society in the Democratisation of Global Governance Institutions: From ‘Soft Power’ to Collective Decision making? 
(2007) 306; Weekes J A Possible Scenario for a Deal on Agricultural Trade Reform (2004). Available at 
http://www.l20.org/publications/2_C3_A_S_Weekes.pdf (Accessed 19 March 2015). 
60 Rolland SE Development at the World Trade Organisation 1 ed (2012) 223; Hoekman B ‘Proposals for WTO Reform: A Synthesis 
and Assessment’ in Narlikar A, Daunton M & Stern RM (eds) The Oxford Handbook on the World Trade Organisation (2012) 746; 
Dube M The Way Forward for the WTO: Reforming the Decision making Process (2012) 15; MacMillan E ‘Doha Decision making: 
Implications of the Consensus and Single Undertaking Principles for Developing Countries’ (2010) 1. 
61 Hoekman B ‘Proposals for WTO Reform: A Synthesis and Assessment’ in Narlikar A, Daunton M & Stern RM (eds) The Oxford 
Handbook on the World Trade Organisation (2012) 747. 
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Before the inception of the single undertaking principle, the involvement of DCs in the then GATT 
was only limited, and was made possible by the so called ‘GATT a la carte’, or ‘cherry picking’; 
which meant that the system allowed Contracting Parties of the GATT to pick and choose some of 
the trade rules and disciplines by which they would be bound.62 However, Member States can no 
longer have a free ride and just select any item that they like on the WTO negotiated agreements. 
Starting with the Uruguay Round, countries were compelled to participate in all of the negotiated 
agreements as part of a ‘single undertaking’63.  
It is noteworthy to mention that the single undertaking took a new significance after the launch of the 
WTO, by becoming not just an ordinary rule, but the gateway to WTO membership.64 From that 
point, all future WTO signatories were required to accept the whole package of negotiated outcomes, 
with no partial opt-outs.65 
One of the premises of the single undertaking is that it guarantees that all participants will at least 
obtain a net benefit from a package deal, by allowing for issue linkages or trade-offs. Issue linkages 
bring together trade related topics, such as Intellectual Property, labour standards and environmental 
protection into a single package in order to take full advantage of trade-off opportunities and to keep 
the enthusiasm for trade negotiations moving forward.66  
As such, Dube concedes that the lack of the single undertaking principle would mean that trade 
matters would be negotiated in silos within the WTO, due to the fact that ‘countries with only 
defensive interests would have no motivation to negotiate and that with issue linkages, there is always 
the guarantee, at least in theory, of getting concessions on offensive interests in other areas, thereby 
enabling negotiations.’67 
                                                                
62 Rolland SE Development at the World Trade Organisation 1 ed (2012) 224; Hoekman BM & Kostecki MM The Political Economy 
of the World Trading System: the WTO and Beyond 3 ed (2009) 51; Ansong A Developing Countries and Decision making in the 
WTO: Reconciling the Principles of Special and Differential Treatment and Sovereign Equality of States (2012) 105; Jones K ‘Green 
Room Politics and the WTO’s Crisis of Representation’ (2009) 353. 
63 Low P WTO Decision making for the Future (2011) 4; Jones K ‘Green Room Politics and the WTO’s Crisis of Representation’ 
(2009) 353. 
64 Article II:2 of the Agreement establishing the WTO provides: “The agreements and associated legal instruments included in 
Annexes 1, 2 and 3 (hereinafter referred to as "Multilateral Trade Agreements") are integral parts of this Agreement, binding on all 
Members.” 
65 Hoekman BM & Kostecki MM The Political Economy of the World Trading System: the WTO and Beyond 3 ed (2009) 66; Ansong 
A Developing Countries and Decision making in the WTO: Reconciling the Principles of Special and Differential Treatment and 
Sovereign Equality of States (2012) 106; Dube M The Way Forward for the WTO: Reforming the Decision making Process (2012) 
15; Low P WTO Decision making for the Future (2011) 4; MacMillan E ‘Doha Decision making: Implications of the Consensus and 
Single Undertaking Principles for Developing Countries’ (2010) 1; Jones K ‘Green Room Politics and the WTO’s Crisis of 
Representation’ (2009) 353. 
66 Hoekman B ‘Proposals for WTO Reform: A Synthesis and Assessment’ in Narlikar A, Daunton M & Stern RM (eds) The Oxford 
Handbook on the World Trade Organisation (2012) 758; Rolland SE Development at the World Trade Organisation 1 ed (2012) 226; 
Dube M The Way Forward for the WTO: Reforming the Decision making Process (2012) 15; Low P WTO Decision making for the 
Future (2011) 4; MacMillan E ‘Doha Decision making: Implications of the Consensus and Single Undertaking Principles for 
Developing Countries’ (2010) 1. 
67 Dube M The Way Forward for the WTO: Reforming the Decision making Process (2012) 15. 
 
 
 
 
  PAGE | 15  
The concept of the single undertaking will be further discussed in great detail in the forthcoming 
chapter, as this principle is particularly crucial in the current situation that the DDA is facing within 
the WTO. 
 
2.3.3. The informal meetings: the Green Room discussions 
In an attempt to consolidate consensus in WTO decision making, informal group meetings can be 
used at the request of the WTO Director-General, or the Chairperson of a committee, such as the 
Green Room discussions, which refers to any closed negotiation in which only a limited number of 
countries (usually 20 to 25), mostly developed countries, are invited to participate in order to discuss 
notable trade issues.68  
The term ‘Green Room’ results from the colour of the Director-General’s conference room that was 
painted green and which was used to host smaller deliberative group discussions69. Decisions taken 
in the Green Room are conveyed to the larger membership for final decision.70  
Although not provided for in the WTO Agreement, the Green Room consultations started in the 
GATT era and are still used in the WTO today as an informal decision making process.71 Previously 
under the GATT, DCs were largely excluded from the Green Room discussions.72 These meetings 
                                                                
68 Jones K The Doha Blues: Institutional Crisis and Reform in the WTO (2011) 1; Dube M The Way Forward for the WTO: Reforming 
the Decision making Process (2012) 18; Ansong A Developing Countries and Decision making in the WTO: Reconciling the 
Principles of Special and Differential Treatment and Sovereign Equality of States (2012) 131; Kenworthy J ‘Reforms of the WTO: 
Basic issues and Concerns’ (2000) 2; VanGrasstek C The History and Future of the World Trade Organisation (2013) 83; Hoekman 
BM & Kostecki MM The Political Economy of the World Trading System: the WTO and Beyond 3 ed (2009) 67; Rolland SE 
Development at the World Trade Organisation 1 ed (2012) 91; Jones K ‘Green Room Politics and the WTO’s Crisis of 
Representation’ (2009) 349.  
69 However, Green Room meetings need not necessarily be held in the Director-General’s conference room. Currently, the term has 
come to be used as a generic name for smaller deliberative group meetings convened to thrash out sensitive trade-related issues 
with the aim of working out compromise solutions in a smaller and intensive set-up. 
70 Ansong A Developing Countries and Decision making in the WTO: Reconciling the Principles of Special and Differential Treatment 
and Sovereign Equality of States (2012) 145; Jones K ‘Green Room Politics and the WTO’s Crisis of Representation’ (2009) 350; 
Alqadhafi SAI The Role of Civil Society in the Democratisation of Global Governance Institutions: From ‘Soft Power’ to Collective 
Decision making? (2007) 400; VanGrasstek C The History and Future of the World Trade Organisation (2013) 83. 
71 Jones K The Doha Blues: Institutional Crisis and Reform in the WTO (2011) 1; Dube M The Way Forward for the WTO: Reforming 
the Decision making Process (2012) 18; Ansong A Developing Countries and Decision making in the WTO: Reconciling the 
Principles of Special and Differential Treatment and Sovereign Equality of States (2012) 131; Kenworthy J ‘Reforms of the WTO: 
Basic issues and Concerns’ (2000) 2. 
72 Rolland SE Development at the World Trade Organisation 1 ed (2012) 92; Ansong A Developing Countries and Decision making 
in the WTO: Reconciling the Principles of Special and Differential Treatment and Sovereign Equality of States (2012) 146; Lal Das B 
The WTO and the Multilateral Trading System: Past, Present and Future (2003) 166; Narlikar A ‘Collective Agency, Systemic 
Consequences: Bargaining Coalition in the WTO’ in Narlikar A, Daunton M & Stern RM (eds) The Oxford Handbook on the World 
Trade Organisation (2012) 1; World Trade Organisation (ed) Understanding the WTO 5ed (2011) 187; Narlikar A ‘Unintended 
Consequences: The G20 and Global Governance’ (2014) 65; Alqadhafi SAI Reforming the WTO: Toward more Democratic 
Governance and Decision making (2007) 7. 
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generally involved less than eight countries and were dominated by the Quad (Canada, the European 
Union (EU), Japan and the United States (US)). 
After the launch of the Uruguay Round, however, the Green Room discussions evolved to include 
typically the Quad, Australia, New Zealand, Switzerland, Norway, a few transition economies and a 
handful of DCs such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Egypt, Hong Kong, India, South Korea, 
Mexico, Pakistan, South Africa, and at least one ASEAN country.73 This shows that the Green Room 
consultations have grown to include a substantial number of emerging economies. 
It is suggested that Green Room meetings are intended to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of 
negotiations by limiting the numbers of negotiators to those key and active players who could help 
move the negotiating process forward.74 The rationale behind this policy is that the WTO has no 
formal steering body where decisions are based on weighted voting and where power is delegated to 
a board of directors or the organisation’s head, as is the case with the executive boards of the IMF 
and the World Bank. Furthermore, since trade negotiators can rarely explore the limits of their 
partners’ flexibility or expose their own difficulties in large on-the-record meetings, it is argued that 
it would be virtually impossible to conduct effective negotiations in an open-ended plenary session 
involving the total membership.75 
The Green Room discussions are also believed to yield some success and cannot be universally 
praised or condemned. For instance, Blackhurst & Hartridge observe that the Green Room was for 
several years a highly efficient management tool and that ‘restricted meetings are in principle 
indefensible, and they are always understandably resented by those excluded, but experience shows 
that they are tolerated, because they are recognized as necessary, so long as they produce results.’76  
It must also be noted that due to the use of coalitions, especially in trade negotiations, the possibility 
exists for a large body of Members, if not the entire membership to be represented through their 
coalition representatives.77 Narlikar supports this view by suggesting that ‘coalitions allow greater 
voice to countries that would otherwise have no say at all in the small group meetings that underpin 
                                                                
73 Dube M The Way Forward for the WTO: Reforming the Decision making Process (2012) 18; Hoekman BM & Kostecki MM The 
Political Economy of the World Trading System: the WTO and Beyond 3 ed (2009) 66; Liang M ‘Evolution of the WTO Decision 
making Process’ (2005) 126; Rolland SE Development at the World Trade Organisation 1 ed (2012) 93. 
74 Jones K ‘Green Room Politics and the WTO’s Crisis of Representation’ (2009) 350; Liang M ‘Evolution of the WTO Decision 
making Process’ (2005) 126. 
75 Hoekman BM & Kostecki MM The Political Economy of the World Trading System: the WTO and Beyond 3 ed (2009) 65; Nguyen 
T, Nguyen Q & Pham P ‘Decision making by Consensus in the WTO’ (2012) 4; Rolland SE Development at the World Trade 
Organisation 1 ed (2012) 215. 
76 Blackhurst R & Hartridge D (2005) 464, quoted in VanGrasstek C The History and Future of the World Trade Organisation (2013) 
204. 
77 Ansong A Developing Countries and Decision making in the WTO: Reconciling the Principles of Special and Differential Treatment 
and Sovereign Equality of States (2012) 147. 
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WTO negotiations, as they allow Members not only greater possibilities of representation but also a 
more informed participation in the negotiation process.’78 
Nevertheless, the informal process of the WTO has come under significant disapprobation from 
experts who argue that the WTO decision making process has become the object of debate, after 
experiencing setbacks such as breakdowns in the Doha Round. The Green Room consultations raise 
questions related to the lack of transparency and exclusivity in the WTO negotiating process.79  
Although the Green Room meetings do not have decision making powers, it is submitted that they 
serve as powerful lobbying forums and that their unrepresentative nature does not bode well for equal 
participation in the WTO decision making process. This question is central to the plausible reasons 
for the impasse in the Doha Round of negotiations and therefore will be discussed in greater details 
in the subsequent chapter. 
 
2.4. Conclusion 
The purpose of the WTO is to ensure that trade flows as smooth, sure and free as possible. It is 
obvious that consensus remains the single most important rule in the decision making processes of 
the WTO. To achieve broad consensus requires great flexibility not only in the content of any final 
agreement but also in the method by which these agreements are negotiated.80 But one size does not 
fit all at the WTO, as agreements are tailored in order to take into account the sensitivities of Members 
and this is one of the reasons why WTO agreements are so complex.81 
In light of all the aforesaid, it is clear that the governing bodies of the WTO rely heavily on a 
multiplicity of decision making processes which are intended to enhance the efficiency of the 
institution However, as shall be explained further in the following chapter, despite the fact that the 
WTO governance has been praised as compared to its Bretton Woods counterparts; its decision 
                                                                
78 Narlikar A ‘Collective Agency, Systemic Consequences: Bargaining Coalition in the WTO’ in Narlikar A, Daunton M & Stern RM 
(eds) The Oxford Handbook on the World Trade Organisation (2012) 1; World Trade Organisation (ed) Understanding the WTO 5ed 
(2011) 185. 
79 Dube M The Way Forward for the WTO: Reforming the Decision making Process (2012) 18; VanGrasstek C The History and 
Future of the World Trade Organisation (2013) 83; MacMillan E ‘Doha Decision making: Implications of the Consensus and Single 
Undertaking Principles for Developing Countries’ (2010) 3; Jones K The Doha Blues: Institutional Crisis and Reform in the WTO 
(2011) 1; Jones K The Doha Blues: Institutional Crisis and Reform in the WTO (2011) 38; Jones K ‘Green Room Politics and the 
WTO’s Crisis of Representation’ (2009) 354; Patel M New Faces in the Green Room: Developing Country Coalitions and Decision 
making in the WTO (2007) 13; Nguyen T, Nguyen Q & Pham P ‘Decision making by Consensus in the WTO’ (2012) 12. 
80 VanGrasstek C The History and Future of the World Trade Organisation (2013). 
81 Kenworthy J ‘Reforms of the WTO: Basic issues and Concerns’ (2000) 2. 
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making process has brought about a number of impediments that ultimately caused the current 
multilateral Round of negotiation to stall for many years. 
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CHAPTER THREE: THE MAIN REASONS FOR THE STALEMATE IN THE 
CURRENT DOHA ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS 
This chapter explores the Doha Round by briefly reviewing its history and subsequently examining 
the apparent causes for the impasse at the current multilateral trade negotiations, followed by a short 
conclusion. 
 
3.1. The Doha Round of negotiations: a brief review 
As stated previously, the Doha Round of multilateral talks is the first one to be negotiated under the 
umbrella of the WTO and the ninth since the end of World War II.82 It was launched at the WTO’s 
fourth MC in Doha, Qatar, in November 2001, where ministers provided a mandate that gives 
direction on the WTO’s existing work programme in ongoing committees and the implementation of 
the WTO Agreement.83 
The goal of the Doha Round is to continue the reduction of trade barriers in order to expand global 
economic growth, development, and opportunity. The Doha negotiations offer an opportunity to 
revive confidence in global trade and to lay the groundwork for the robust global trading system of 
tomorrow. In addition, the Doha Ministerial Declaration gave this Round its mandate to negotiate 
liberalisation of agriculture, services and IPRs.84 
The new multilateral negotiations were billed as a Development Round or Doha Development 
Agenda (DDA) because of their presumed focus on the improvement of the trading prospects and 
needs of DCs and LDCs.85 The DDA is considered a Round for DCs because it acknowledged the 
need to solves imbalances in areas of interest to DCs, recognised the need to provide binding and 
meaningful special and differential treatment and acknowledged the challenges faced by DCs in the 
implementation of the last Round of negotiations.86 
The agenda of the Doha mandate is broad: there are 21 subjects listed in the Doha Declaration.87 
Initially intended to be completed by the end of 2005, the talks have been progressing at a very slow 
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pace because stricken by disagreements, specifically over agricultural issues, including cotton, and 
ended in deadlock on the ‘Singapore issues’.88 To date, and despite several attempts to advance the 
negotiations, this Round has not been successfully closed.89 
After staggering along for six years, the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations in the WTO 
hit an impasse in July 2008 and again, in November 2011. Three years later, participants managed to 
ultimately harvest a small reward at the ninth MC in Bali in December 2013, promising to develop a 
work plan to complete the remainder of the agenda.90 
In the following sections, some of the significant factors responsible for the Round’s stalemate will 
be considered. 
 
3.2. An overview of the causes of the Doha Round stalemate 
The Doha Round was initially scheduled to conclude at the end of 2005. Nevertheless, that did not 
happen; the trade negotiations stalled in November 2011 after staggering along for 10 years of talks 
and despite official efforts by many countries and by nearly all the eminent trade experts of today.91 
The failure to effectively conclude the Doha Round suggests that the world lost the gains from trade 
that a successful agreement would have brought about, since an incomplete Round would virtually 
halt trade liberalisation for years to come.92 It is noteworthy to mention that the multilateral trade 
negotiations is one of the three pillars on which the WTO system relies, and according to Bhagwati, 
breaking that specific pillar adversely affects the functioning of the other two, namely, the WTO's 
rule making authority and its Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM).93 Hence, it appears that the 
costs of the Doha stalemate are also likely to be high for the WTO itself. 
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In light of the aforementioned, it is significant to understand the causes for the deadlock in the 
multilateral negotiations. The following subsections will identify some of the most significant factors 
responsible for the Round’s standstill. Although the causes that lead to the impasse in the Doha Round 
are multiple, they cannot all be explored, due to limitations on the length of this Research Paper. As 
this research topic places great emphasis on the position of the emerging economies and LDCs, only 
those plausible causes associated to this particular topic will be explored. 
 
3.2.1. The rise of the South as an impediment to achieving consensus 
The emergence of major DCs and LDCs in the field of world trade has changed the configuration of 
economic power and has also been one of the defining features of globalisation since the start of the 
current Round, and as such could be perceived as one of the main causes of the Doha Round 
stalemate.94 The world economy has witnessed an unprecedented growth rate in the DCs’ share of 
global output, doubling from about 20 per cent in the early 2000s to 40 per cent in 2013.95 This 
progress has also been reflected in their rapidly expanding export volume. In 1990, the combined 
merchandise exports from all DCs stood at US$850 billion, which reached US$2 trillion over the next 
decade and then US$9 trillion in 2012. Now, the DCs’ combined share of global export trade is almost 
50 per cent.96 
Consequently, there is an evident shift in world economic power that has profoundly improved the 
way DCs and LDCs are now perceived at the WTO.97 The WTO is increasingly spreading its coverage 
to different areas of the globe, particularly to these DCs and LDCs, and the impact of the WTO 
agreements (as compared to the GATT) and their operation are much wider and deeper for the 
economies of those countries.98  
During the GATT era, the DCs and LDCs remained unheard; they never had a decisive role in the 
GATT system and their interests were generally ignored or were never seriously executed by the 
developed countries.99 For instance, the tariffs in the developed countries on the products of special 
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export interest to DCs and LDCs remained high; quantitative restraints on imports continue to exist 
in some important sectors of interest to them, such as textiles.100 
Nowadays however, the structural change in the distribution of world economic power could be seen 
as a positive mechanism for the balance of the global trading system. There is a clear indication that 
DCs and LDCs are no longer ignored and voiceless at multilateral talks, and that the more powerful 
emerging countries can resist what they perceive to be a flawed, unfair, or unacceptable deal.101 This 
is further illustrated by VanGrasstek when he states: 
‘A small circle of developed countries called the shots in the GATT period, but economic 
influence and political power are much more broadly distributed in the WTO period. The 
widening scope of membership, coupled with different rates of growth in developed and 
developing countries, can be seen in the relative decline of the Quad and the 
commensurate rise of emerging economies such as Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Mexico, South Africa and Turkey […].’102 
In light of this quote, it is assumed that the emerging economies have become a dominant force in the 
global economy and are having a greater influence than ever at the WTO that enables them to veto 
most decisions that are to their detriment in multilateral talks. For instance, in 2001 when China 
became a Member of the WTO, nobody predicted it to become the world’s largest exporter by 2010. 
And now that issues, such as China’s tariff profile have become of global interest, China has gained 
great influence during trade negotiations.103 
As such, the slow pace of the Doha negotiations is exacerbated by the division between developed 
nations and DCs.104 It is widely accepted among trade experts that on a broader level, at the heart of 
the current Doha difficulties lies a conflict that has always been present, to varying degrees, in the 
modern multilateral trade system between the majority of DCs which wish to orient it towards their 
developmental needs since the Round is labelled as a Development Agenda, and developed Members 
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which consider it as a means to improve market access in their favour with the fewest concessions 
possible.105 This conflict of interests between parties would in turn prevent from yielding the 
necessary political will that is needed to successfully close this Round. 
As a matter of fact, the DCs have played a key role in instances of deadlock in trade negotiations 
since the Uruguay Round and have sometimes been at the centre of such impasse, thus demonstrating 
a clearer picture of what the balance of power is within the WTO. With the power shift within the 
WTO, this process is intensifying nowadays as the DCs are now able to not merely resist, but 
increasingly set the terms of debate and influence certain changes in the structure of the institutions 
of global governance.106 This statement is clarified once again below: 
‘The politics within and between these groups,107 and their relationships with the 
remaining Members of the WTO, are much more complicated and contentious than had 
been the case in the GATT period. This has altered the conduct of multilateral trade 
diplomacy, which once appeared to be something like a developed-country oligarchy that 
met in the Green Room but today bears a closer resemblance to a diverse, representative 
democracy that is principally conducted through coalitions.’108 
In this sense, it can be seen that the emerging economies are more aware of their influence within the 
WTO; and that such influence enables them to oppose whichever proposition that is to their detriment, 
which as a result paralyses the whole negotiating process. 
 
3.2.2.  The size of the World Trade Organisation’s current membership 
 Any system of decision making is bound to have some degree of friction. However, the cumulative 
frictions associated with a decision making system that takes into account a large number of actors, 
such as in the case of the WTO, would inevitably lead to co-ordination failure.109 
As such, the number of participants in the WTO talks is by far the largest ever, and makes it 
intrinsically difficult to reach consensus on all negotiations. The WTO’s membership currently stands 
at 161 countries,110 and amongst them are nine countries that each have more than 100 million 
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inhabitants (two have above 1 billion) and another 13 countries that have less than 100,000 inhabitants 
each. In these conditions, reaching consensus among such a diverse membership is undeniably a 
herculean task, considering the fact that each Member State has its particular trade interests and that 
the world trade agenda is set by developed countries, which make up less than one-third of the total 
membership while DCs and LDCs now make up the mathematical majority. Hence, they should be 
setting the agenda. 111 VanGrasstek demonstrated this argument when he states: 
‘Consider the hypothetical case of China and India blocking consensus on some matter 
that otherwise has wide support, which might lead indignant negotiators from other 
countries to criticise the ability of just two Members to frustrate the aims of the rest. A 
Chinese or Indian negotiator might respond that, as the representatives of 37 per cent of 
the world’s population, they must exercise their right to prevent a deal that they judge not 
to be in the best interests of their people. Consider also that the 22 smallest WTO 
Members are home to just 7.5 million people. Should that group, with a shared population 
approximating those of Bulgaria or Bogotá, have 10 per cent more votes than the entire 
Group of Twenty (G20)? Any forum in which such demographically disparate units come 
together needs to develop rules that balance the sometimes conflicting needs of 
inclusiveness and efficiency, as well as the competing demands of predictability and 
flexibility.’112  
In light of the aforesaid, it is difficult to achieve and sustain consensus over a comprehensive agenda 
from 161 Members. Regardless of whether it is developed, DC or LDC, if a country is big enough to 
cast its shadow over the trade negotiations, it can bend the agenda to its own will; and regardless of 
the fact that they constitute the majority, DCs and LDCs differ among themselves when it comes to 
their national interests. 
 
3.2.3. The problematic issue of the single undertaking in the Doha Round 
Another cause for the standstill in the Doha Round could be the use of the thorny single 
undertaking rule. As the negotiations are indivisible, trade-offs and deals are not only 
challenging to achieve, but also demand experience in international negotiations. This of course 
bears the risk that nothing can be achieved if time pressure, the complexity of the issues within 
the DDA and the money at stake contribute to an atmosphere of brinkmanship, which could 
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make the status quo seem preferable to any movement in an unknown direction.113 Therefore, 
Members willingly join a consensus if they believe it will be the most beneficial, even if it is 
not what they really want. 
Although this rule is crucial for the decision making within the WTO, it remains, however, a 
serious problem and therefore is perceived by many as a severe disadvantage for DCs and LDCs 
and a great impediment to the conclusion of the DDA.114 A number of trade analysts reflect 
that, on the one hand, the single undertaking entails issue linkages and logrolling; in other 
words, all future WTO signatories are required to accept the whole package of negotiated 
outcomes, with no partial opt-outs.115  
On the other hand, it is believed that the DCs and LDCs are compelled to be party to the wide 
range of new agreements under the single undertaking principle, which some governments 
considered as ‘coercive’. They perceive it to be a selective and exclusionary system of decision 
making, claiming that it is inherently biased against their interests and produces asymmetrical 
agreements.116 This requirement has become a ‘double-edged sword’ as far as DCs and LDCs 
are concerned, and it would particularly mean that they have to commit to substantially greater 
reforms of their trade barriers and trade practices than they did in the past; thus, they need to be 
better informed about the trade issues under negotiation.117 
Furthermore, Oxfam contends that the single undertaking approach ‘wrongly assumes a parity 
in the readiness of all WTO Members to undertake commitments in areas such as IPRs and 
investment liberalisation’.118 But the reality is that the lack of legal resources and research 
support weakens the ability of DCs to raise their voices and address their priorities in a more 
effective way as all countries are not engaging on equal terms.119  
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It is noteworthy to mention that all Member States are not on the same level within the various 
WTO committees, and that the smaller LDCs remain at a distinct disadvantage with regards to 
the single undertaking because their governments are less experienced regarding the details of 
international trade rules and often lack resources, having at times only one representative in 
Geneva to follow all WTO matters.120 Consequently, the more powerful States, such as the US 
and the EU, drive the agenda of the WTO. Needless to say, a number of DCs and LDCs are still 
grappling with the implementation of some of the agreements ratified during the Uruguay 
Round and are simply not ready to take on additional reform burdens at least at the pace at 
which their developed counterparts want them to.121 Therefore, it remains difficult to put 
agreements into operation without everyone agreeing to move at the speed of the slowest 
Member. 
 
3.2.4. The Green Room meetings and their lack of transparency concerns  
A further probable reason for the Doha impasse is the apparent lack of transparency within the WTO 
decision making system. Although the WTO has been relatively effective in devising a consensus 
based decision making system that empowers any Member State irrespective of its size, demographics 
and economic influence, to have veto power, the conduct of negotiations leading to such decision 
making by means of informal consultations has been vehemently criticised in both the GATT and the 
WTO.122  
The method, referred to as Green Room meetings, has largely been unsuccessful at being transparent 
and inclusive, resulting in major setbacks for the negotiations and the institution, to the extent that 
then EU Trade Commissioner Lamy criticised the decision making by referring to it as ‘medieval’.123 
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The traditional Green Room consultations, in which a relatively small number of selected developed 
and emerging countries get together to decide on divisive issues, excluded too many newly active 
players in WTO negotiations and thus had problems building consensus. The few contracting parties 
allowed into the Green Room cut the most important deals, provoking resentment from those left 
outside.124 
Likewise, the WTO like the GATT before it is most severely criticised for reflecting the powerful 
economic and trade interests of the major developed countries in informal consultations, rather than 
the interests of the entire membership as a whole. As a result, a number of observers are questioning 
the legitimacy of the G-20125 within the Green Room discussions.126 They all point out the 
problematic exclusionary membership of the G20, to the extent that it leads the DCs that are not 
included to invest in alternative trade forums, as clearly underlined by Narlikar when she asserts: 
‘One only has to look back on the GATT, and the WTO […], and recall the amount of 
flack that they attracted because of their lack of transparency and accountability towards 
the great majority of DCs. The GATT was often referred to as the ‘Rich Man’s Club’ 
where consultations were held in invitation-only ‘Green Room’ meetings, and where the 
key decision making forum was the so-called Quad. This exclusionary method of decision 
making led poor countries to turn to alternative forums – such as the UNCTAD – rather 
than invest their resources and efforts in the GATT/ WTO’.127 
It is apparent in view of the foregoing that the perceived bias within the WTO had led to the formation 
in recent years by the emerging economies of some alliances which are seen as positive 
counterbalances to the power of the Quad in directing global trade, particularly with respect to 
negotiations over agricultural goods, upon which most of these economies depend.128 The recent trade 
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negotiations further cemented this process of incorporating coalitions into WTO decision making, 
particularly the informal meetings. Several alliances have been created since the Cancun MC in 2003, 
which include but are not limited to the ACP,129 the G-33,130 the African Group,131 the LDCs (G-
90)132, and so forth.133  
One such coalition, the Like Minded group of Developing Countries (LMDC)134 under the leadership 
of China and India, initially brought together countries that opposed the placement of labour standards 
on the negotiating agenda at the 1996 Singapore MC. Later this Group stressed the importance of 
implementation issues for DCs, and favoured a more inclusive negotiating procedure over the 
domination by large countries in the Green Room.135  
According to Jones, the LMDC ‘was attempting to restrike the balance of negotiating power in the 
WTO in favour of the growing majority of DCs by bringing the negotiating process more into the 
open, where the large and rich countries would have to leave their backroom machinations behind.’136 
Hence, it is evident that coalitions of DCs and LDCs are formed in order to reduce the sphere of 
influence of developed countries and to increase the participation of emerging economies in the 
                                                                
Process’ (2005) 127; Narlikar A ‘New Powers in the Club: The Challenges of Global Trade Governance’ (2010) 719; Narlikar A 
‘Unintended Consequences: The G20 and Global Governance’ (2014) 65; Narlikar A ‘Collective Agency, Systemic Consequences: 
Bargaining Coalition in the WTO’ in Narlikar A, Daunton M & Stern RM (eds) The Oxford Handbook on the World Trade Organisation 
(2012) 1; World Trade Organisation (ed) Understanding the WTO 5ed (2011) 187. 
129 The African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP) is a group of countries in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific that 
was created by the Georgetown Agreement in 1975. The group's main objectives are sustainable development and poverty 
reduction within its Member States, as well as their greater integration into the world's economy. The ACP Group consists of 79 
Member-States, all of them, except Cuba are signatories to the Cotonou Agreement which binds them to the EU: 48 countries from 
Sub-Saharan Africa, 16 from the Caribbean and 15 from the Pacific. 
130 The G33, also called ‘Friends of Special Products’ in agriculture is a group of DCs that coordinate on trade and economic issues. 
It was created in order to help a group of countries that were all facing similar problems. The G33 has proposed special rules for DCs 
at WTO negotiations, like allowing them to continue to restrict access to their agricultural markets. 
131 The African Group consists of all the 54 Members States on the African continent, which constitutes 28 per cent of all UN 
Members. It is thus the largest regional group by number of Member States and the only regional group that has a territory that 
coincides with the traditional continent of which its name originates. The African Group has 3 seats on the Security Council, all non-
permanent, currently occupied by Angola, Chad, and Nigeria. The Group also has 14 seats on the United Nations Economic and 
Social Council and 13 seats on the United Nations Human Rights Council. 
132 The G-90 is an alliance between the poorest and smallest DCs, many of whom are part of the WTO. The G-90 emerged as a 
strong grouping at the WTO’s MC at Cancun in 2003, taking common positions representing the largest number of countries with 64 
of the 90 countries in the G-90 being Members of the WTO. It is the largest trading body in the WTO, and it was formed as an 
umbrella body including the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group (ACP), the African Union, and the group of Least Developed 
Countries (LDC). 
133 Narlikar A & Van Houten P ‘Know the Enemy: Uncertainty and Deadlock in the WTO” in Narlikar A (ed) Deadlock in Multilateral 
Negotiations: Causes and Solutions (2010) 152; Rolland SE Developing country coalitions at the WTO: in search of legal support 
(2007) 484; Patel M ‘Building coalitions and consensus in the WTO’ (2007) 1-2; Patel M New Faces in the Green Room: Developing 
Country Coalitions and Decision making in the WTO (2007) 13-14. 
134 The Like Minded group of Developing Countries (LMDC) is a group of DCs who organise themselves as a block negotiators in 
international organisations such as the UN and the WTO and they represent more than 50 per cent of the world's population. The 
Member Countries of the LMDC are: Algeria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bhutan, China, Cuba, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, 
Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, The Philippines Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe.[1] 
135 VanGrasstek C The History and Future of the World Trade Organisation (2013) 93. 
136 Jones K The Doha Blues: Institutional Crisis and Reform in the WTO (2011) 38. 
 
 
 
 
  PAGE | 29  
informal processes. Given this trend, DC coalitions have now emerged as an integral part of the 
consensus-building process in the WTO. 
 
3.2.5.  The intrinsic difficulties of reaching an agreement among Member States 
3.2.5.1. The broadness of the Doha Development Agenda  
One of the most immediate factors that has led to the standstill in the recent multilateral 
negotiations is unquestionably the sheer breadth of the DDA. The Doha mandate is 
comprehensive: there are 21 wide-ranging subjects from the area of agricultural subsidies to the 
‘new issues’ of investment, IPRs, and government procurement.137 And due to the use of the 
single undertaking format at the current Round of negotiations, there are nine areas138 that can 
be revisited at any time until everything is agreed upon.139 
Hence, this makes the root of the problem structural in nature as the number of issues is too vast to 
be tackled under a ‘single undertaking,’ which exacerbates the difficulty still further. 
 
3.2.5.2. The burning issues of agricultural trade, subsidies and market access 
Similarly, one of the most important issues that was brought to the table in the Doha Round and had 
not yet made its way through is indeed agricultural trade, a very sensitive topic especially for countries 
like the US and the EU that heavily subsidy this economic sector.140 The topic was isolated from the 
GATT in the 1950s and was the subject of failed negotiations in both the Kennedy and the Uruguay 
Rounds. Negotiators re-incorporated agriculture into the system, with countries making commitments 
affecting not only market access but also their production and export subsidies.141 
                                                                
137 Refer supra for the list of the 21 subjects listed in the DDA (See Section 3.1). 
138 These areas are agriculture (including cotton), market access for manufactured or non-agricultural products (NAMA), services, 
rules (including antidumping, non-agricultural subsidies and countervailing measures, and fisheries subsidies), trade facilitation, 
trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPS), environmental goods and services, and development (mainly comprising 
revision of Special and Differential Treatment provisions across WTO agreements). Furthermore, negotiations to update rules 
governing WTO dispute settlement, while not formally part of the Doha talks, may be difficult to conclude without being balanced 
through a broader Doha agreement. 
139 International Monetary Fund (IMF) (ed) The WTO Doha Trade Round—Unlocking the Negotiations and Beyond (2011) 3. 
140 Bhagwati JN, Krishna P & Panagariya A The World Trade System: Trends and Challenges (2014) 17; Khor M ‘Why WTO talks 
collapsed’ (2008) Third World Network Available at http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/wto.info/twninfo20080805.htm (Accessed 11 May 
2014). 
141 Eagleton-Pierce M Symbolic Power in the World Trade Organisation (2013) 71; Bhagwati JN, Krishna P & Panagariya A The 
World Trade System: Trends and Challenges (2014) 17; VanGrasstek C The History and Future of the World Trade Organisation 
(2013) 56. 
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During the Doha negotiations, the emerging economies pursued maximum flexibility for their group 
and focussed on the market opening obligations of the developed countries. The greatest cuts in tariffs 
and the most significant burdens fall on the developed countries, whereas DCs enjoy more relaxed 
cuts and longer implementation time, thus having significant flexibility.142 While hegemonic 
countries like the US and the EU managed to impose their own rules on weaker countries, emerging 
economies such as Brazil, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) insisted on rejecting such demands 
when made part of multilateral talks.143 
 
3.2.5.3. The call for considerable tariff cuts and Non-Agricultural Market Access 
(NAMA) 
Since 2008, multilateral talks have stalled mainly over tariff reduction initiatives for specific 
industrial goods sectors. Developed countries have insisted on unlocking greater gains in actual 
market access for these sectors than implied by the planned broad based cuts. However, an agreement 
has not been reached with key emerging countries.144 After the stalemate in negotiations, many 
representatives expressed regret at the failure. Malaysian Ambassador Yacob voiced his frustration, 
asserting that it meant that a chance for lowering the developed countries’ agricultural subsidies was 
squandered, and also because his country would have had more export opportunities had the tariffs 
been reduced.145 
The grand bargain of the DDA was easily and quite precisely summed up in the aftermath of the Hong 
Kong MC, in 2006 by the ‘Financial Times’: ‘The EU reduces farm tariffs, the US cuts agricultural 
subsidies and the advanced emerging market countries like India and Brazil open their services and 
goods markets’.146 The foregoing statement clearly illustrates the extent to which the contentious 
divisions have deeply affected the multilateral negotiations for the past 20 years. 
 
                                                                
142 Helble M & Wignaraja G ‘Will the WTO Bali conference advance the Doha Round and Asia?’ (2013) Available at 
http://www.voxeu.org/article/what-prospects-wto-deal-bali(Accessed 11 May 2014). 
143 Eagleton-Pierce M Symbolic Power in the World Trade Organisation (2013) 71; Bhagwati JN ‘Why Doha Round failed’ (2009) 
Available at http://economistonline.muogao.com/2008/08/bhagwati-why-doha-Round-failed.html (Accessed 25 April 2014). 
144 International Monetary Fund (IMF) (ed) The WTO Doha Trade Round—Unlocking the Negotiations and Beyond (2011) 2. 
145 Bhagwati JN Why Doha Round failed’ (2009) Available at http://economistonline.muogao.com/2008/08/bhagwati-why-doha-
Round-failed.html (Accessed 25 April 2014); Bhagwati JN, Krishna P & Panagariya A The World Trade System: Trends and 
Challenges (2014) 17. 
146 Eagleton-Pierce M Symbolic Power in the World Trade Organisation (2013) 74; ‘Doha Unity Boils down to a Matter of Trust and 
Time’ The Financial Times (2006) 2, quoted in Reiterer M ‘The Doha Development Agenda of the WTO: Possible Institutional 
Implications’ (2009) 365; Bhagwati JN, Krishna P & Panagariya A The World Trade System: Trends and Challenges (2014) 17. 
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3.3. Conclusion 
To conclude, it is widely understood that the apparent long standing impasse in the DDA is largely 
caused on the one hand by the lack of flexibility in the decision making system within the WTO, 
particularly the consensus and single undertaking principle, and by the confrontation between 
developed and DCs/LDCs on sensitive trade issues on the other hand.147 
Nevertheless, as stated earlier, consensus remains the sole most significant rule in the decision making 
processes of the WTO. While some question whether the multilateral trading system is well served 
by a rule that confers a veto power on each and every Member, irrespective of its physical, 
demographic and economic size, there is also a widespread belief that the WTO Members would 
likely oppose any efforts to replace consensus with qualified majority voting.148 
It is clear that rescuing the Doha Round seems to be a challenging task. But a more impossible mission 
would be to prolong the Round any longer than it already has been, due to the fact that ‘it might end 
up jeopardising the multilateral trade system as well as threaten future prospects for WTO-led 
liberalisation and reform’.149 However, Baldwin contends that there is no reason to be anxious over 
the current stalemate, because history has shown that the past multilateral negotiations were 
overwhelmed by lengthy stalemates as well without resulting in the complete failure of a negotiating 
Round, so long as the Member States are still committed to a successful outcome.150 
Thus, a viable option could be to rescue at least the partial agreements that resulted from the previous 
negotiations and focus on launching new multilateral initiatives aimed at reinstating trust and 
credibility within the WTO and keeping the Organisation on track to achieving its goals.151 By 
agreeing on these terms, the multilateral trade system would benefit from more credibility as it will 
provide near-term results. 152 
Following unfavourable efforts to revive the negotiations at the 2009 and 2011 MCs, the following 
MC in Bali symbolises another tremendous chance for WTO delegates to go back to the drawing 
                                                                
147 Dube M The Way Forward for the WTO: Reforming the Decision making Process (2012) 5; Muzaka V & Bishop ML ‘Doha 
Stalemate: The End of Trade Multilateralism?’ (2015) 390. 
148 VanGrasstek C The History and Future of the World Trade Organisation (2013) 209. 
149 Bhagwati JN ‘Why Doha Round failed’ (2009) Available at http://economistonline.muogao.com/2008/08/bhagwati-why-doha-
Round-failed.html (Accessed 25 April 2014).; Khor M ‘Why WTO talks collapsed’ (2008) Third World Network Available at 
http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/wto.info/twninfo20080805.htm (Accessed 11 May 2014). 
150 Baldwin RE ‘Standstills in WTO trade negotiations are not that unusual’ (2009) Available at http://www.voxeu.org/article/doha-
Round-not-breathing-still-alive (Accessed 10 May 2014). 
151 Bhagwati JN ‘Why Doha Round failed’ (2009) Available at http://economistonline.muogao.com/2008/08/bhagwati-why-doha-
Round-failed.html (Accessed 25 April 2014). 
152 The Times of India ‘WTO package is to India's advantage and should receive broad political support’ (2013) Available at 
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/opinion/edit-page/WTO-package-is-to-Indias-advantage-and-should-receive-broad-political-
support/articleshow/27142204.cms (Accessed 29 April 2014). 
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board.153 As shall be discussed further in the following chapter of this Research Paper, the successful 
conclusion of the ninth MC in Bali some 12 years after the launch of the DDA has brought a fresh 
and reinvigorating impetus to the future of the Round and the WTO multilateral trading system as a 
whole, thus enabling talks to get back on track post-Bali. Given the numerous attempts to address 
these issues at previous MCs, what could be done differently in Bali to move the process forward? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                
153 Helble M & Wignaraja G ‘Will the WTO Bali conference advance the Doha Round and Asia?’ (2013) Available at 
http://www.voxeu.org/article/what-prospects-wto-deal-bali(Accessed 11 May 2014). 
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CHAPTER 4: THE IMPACT OF BALI ACCORD ON THE DOHA ROUND 
STALEMATE 
This chapter evaluates the influence of the Bali Accord on the Doha Round impasse, specifically how 
it comes to the rescue of the DDA and how far the agreement puts an emphasis on the interests of 
DCs and LDCs, followed by a short conclusion. 
 
4.1. Bali Accord: saviour of the Doha Round 
After years of uncompromising stances that continuously culminated in collapsed multilateral 
negotiations of Doha and the unsuccessful attempts to re-launch the negotiations at the 2009 and 
2011MCs, the WTO Member States have eagerly decided to pick up the pieces with the purpose of 
concluding the Doha Round, if nothing else to salvage some parts of it.154 
In December 2013, after five days of intense negotiations that had often seemed too close to call, 
trade ministers from 159 countries managed to generate sufficient political will and finally reached 
an agreement intended to boost global trade, the first comprehensive agreement reached through the 
WTO that is approved by all its Members.155 The Bali Agreement as it is known, is a trade agreement 
resulting from the 2013 Bali MC held in Indonesia and is aimed at lowering global trade barriers and 
involves an effort to simplify the procedures for doing business across borders. 156 As such, the Bali 
Summit marked the first substantive breakthrough for the WTO since the launch of the Doha Round 
in 2001 and the inception of the organisation in 1995. It represents a tremendous opportunity to bring 
                                                                
154 Priyadarshi S & Rahman T ‘Build up to the ninth WTO Ministerial Conference: issues of interest to LDCs’ (2013)1; Wolfe R ‘First 
Diagnose, Then Treat: What Ails the Doha Round?’ (2015) 7; Jatkar A & Mukumba C Unpacking the Bali Package A Snapshot of the 
Bali Ministerial Decisions of the WTO Members (2014) 2; Khor M ‘Why WTO talks collapsed’ (2008) Third World Network Available 
at http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/wto.info/twninfo20080805.htm (Accessed 11 May 2014); Bhagwati JN ‘Why Doha Round failed’ 
(2009) Available at http://economistonline.muogao.com/2008/08/bhagwati-why-doha-round-failed.html (Accessed 25 April 2014). 
155 Food and Agriculture Organisation (ed) The Bali Package – Implications for Trade and Food Security (2014) 1; Soobramanien TY 
& Fevrier S ‘The Bali package – A breath of fresh air to the Doha round’ (2014) 1; Wolfe R ‘First Diagnose, Then Treat: What Ails the 
Doha Round?’ (2015) 7; Dube M Can the Bali Package Resolve the Doha Impasse and Secure the Future of the WTO? (2014) 1; 
Bellmann C ‘The Bali agreement: implications for development and the WTO’ (2014) 3; Wilkinson R ‘Fit for Purpose?: The 
multilateral trading system and the post-2015 Development Agenda’ (2014) 1; Wilkinson R, Hannah E & Scott J ‘The WTO in Bali: 
what MC9 means for the Doha Development Agenda and why it matters’ (2014) 1033; Narlikar A & Priyadarshi S ‘Empowering the 
poor? The successes and limitations of the Bali package for the LDCs’ (2014) 1054; Priyadarshi S & Rahman T ‘The Bali LDC 
package: how to take it forward’ (2014) 1. 
156 Bellmann C ‘The Bali agreement: implications for development and the WTO’ (2014) 3; Priyadarshi S & Rahman T ‘The Bali LDC 
package: how to take it forward’ (2014) 1; Walker A ‘WTO agrees global trade deal worth $1tn’ (2013) Available at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-25274889 (Accessed 11 May 2014); Willenbockel D ‘The WTO Bali Deal: ‘Doha Lite and 
Decaffeinated’ (2013) Available at http://www.globalisationanddevelopment.com/2013/12/the-wto-bali-deal-doha-lite-
and.html(Accessed 11 May 2014). 
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back WTO Members to the negotiation table with the objective of reinstating trust and credibility 
within the WTO.157 
At the closing ceremony of the Summit, Director Azevêdo declared that ‘It may have seemed 
impossible, but now it is done. For the first time in our history, the WTO has truly delivered’, causing 
his speech to be greeted with acclamation from the audience.158 He believes that the Bali Accord is 
the springboard to complete the DDA, arguing that this package was the first successful agreement 
in WTO meetings for the past 20 years since the last multilateral deal was signed.159. Another reason 
is that there was recognition that an agreement on the entire Round, which involves agriculture, 
manufacturing and services, was a non-starter and also because the WTO found a way of conducting 
the talks during the Bali Summit that avoided alienating the bulk of the membership.160  
It is significant to acknowledge the role of the new WTO governance in successfully concluding the 
Bali meeting. Although there was apprehension over what a failure in Bali would mean for the future 
of the multilateral trading system, several scholars and experts across the literature explored have 
essentially credited Azevêdo’s leadership, energy and efforts at forging an inclusive and transparent 
negotiation process for the successful agreement of this package.161 His attempt to ensure that the 
negotiations be conducted on the basis of a freely given mandate together with his clear desire not to 
present Members with a negotiating text that reflected his views − as it had been the case during 
previous Rounds − have been widely praised, causing him to receive a great standing ovation by the 
entire membership. 
                                                                
157 Wilkinson R, Hannah E & Scott J ‘The WTO in Bali: what MC9 means for the Doha Development Agenda and why it matters’ 
(2014) 1033; Narlikar A & Priyadarshi S ‘Empowering the poor? The successes and limitations of the Bali package for the LDCs’ 
(2014) 1054; Priyadarshi S & Rahman T ‘The Bali LDC package: how to take it forward’ (2014) 1; Koopmann G & Wittig S Whither 
WTO – The Multilateral Trading System After Bali (2014) 2; Soobramanien TY & Fevrier S ‘The Bali package – A breath of fresh air 
to the Doha round’ (2014) 1; Meléndez-Ortiz R; Bellmann C & Hepburn J (eds) Tackling Agriculture in the Post-Bali Context (2014) 5; 
Fukahori Y ‘The Doha development round of the WTO negotiations: A possible future direction’ (2013) 26; Dube M Can the Bali 
Package Resolve the Doha Impasse and Secure the Future of the WTO? (2014) 1; Kyo Suh J ‘The WTO Ministerial and Asian 
Integration: A Korean Perspective’ in Fukunaga Y, Riady J, and Sauvé P (eds) The Road to Bali: ERIA Perspectives on the WTO 
Ministerial and Asian Integration (2013) 38; Walker A ‘WTO agrees global trade deal worth $1tn’ (2013) Available at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-25274889 (Accessed 11 May 2014). 
158 Azevêdo R ‘Speech of the WTO Director-General in the Bali Ministerial Conference closing ceremony’ (2013) Available at 
http://wto.org/english/news_e/news13_e/mc9sum_07dec13_e.htm (Accessed 5 May 2014). 
159 Bellmann C ‘The Bali agreement: implications for development and the WTO’ (2014) 3; Priyadarshi S & Rahman T ‘The Bali LDC 
package: how to take it forward’ (2014) 1; Walker A ‘WTO agrees global trade deal worth $1tn’ (2013) Available at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-25274889 (Accessed 11 May 2014); Hoekman B The Bali Trade Facilitation Agreement and 
Rulemaking in the WTO: Milestone, Mistake or Mirage? (2014) 1. 
160 Dube M Can the Bali Package Resolve the Doha Impasse and Secure the Future of the WTO? (2014) 1; Walker A ‘WTO agrees 
global trade deal worth $1tn’ (2013) Available at http://www.bbc.com/news/business-25274889 (Accessed 11 May 2014). 
161 Wilkinson R, Hannah E & Scott J ‘The WTO in Bali: what MC9 means for the Doha Development Agenda and why it matters’ 
(2014) 1038; Wilkinson R The WTO, The UN, and the Future of Global Development: What Matters and Why (2014) 1; Dube M Can 
the Bali Package Resolve the Doha Impasse and Secure the Future of the WTO? (2014) 1; Narlikar A & Priyadarshi S ‘Empowering 
the poor? The successes and limitations of the Bali package for the LDCs’ (2014) 1054. 
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Building up to Bali, the systemic implications of a failed meeting have been questioned by almost all 
the trade specialists. In this context, the successful conclusion of the Bali Agreement is the best 
possible global trade development orchestrated by the entire WTO membership, as failure of Bali in 
this respect would have represented a serious setback for the WTO and would have eroded confidence 
in the process of multilateral trade negotiations in the DDA.162 The failure of the Bali Summit would 
also have translated into a seriously weakened WTO and prompted recourse to more mega-regional 
deals, bringing with them non-negligible risks of serious fragmentation along regional and 
preferential lines.163  
That being said, what exactly are the negotiated outcomes that were agreed in Bali? The following 
sections will elaborate on the mains issues of the Bali Accord. 
 
4.2.  An overview of the main focus areas of the Bali Package 
The Bali agreement comprises 10 texts covering three broad areas namely, TF, agriculture and issue 
of interest for LDCs. The content and politics of each of these will be examined in turn. 
4.2.1.  Trade Facilitation Agreement 
The TFA or TF164 constitutes without a doubt the single most significant component of the Bali 
Accord and hence the main outcome of the Bali Ministerial.165 
                                                                
162 Bendini R, O'keefe J & Nieminem H The 2013 Ministerial Conference in Bali: Last chance for the WTO? (2013) 4; Wilkinson R, 
Hannah E & Scott J ‘The WTO in Bali: what MC9 means for the Doha Development Agenda and why it matters’ (2014) 1038; 
Karmakar S Life after Bali: Renewing the World Trade Negotiating Agenda (2013) 2; Narlikar A & Priyadarshi S ‘Empowering the 
poor? The successes and limitations of the Bali package for the LDCs’ (2014) 1054. 
163 Oo S and Naing ZZ ‘Expected Outcomes from the Bali Accord: the View from Myanma’r in Fukunaga Y, Riady J, and Sauvé P 
(eds) The Road to Bali: ERIA Perspectives on the WTO Ministerial and Asian Integration (2013) 123; Bhagwati JN, Krishna P & 
Panagariya A The World Trade System: Trends and Challenges (2014) 4; Narlikar A & Priyadarshi S ‘Empowering the poor? The 
successes and limitations of the Bali package for the LDCs’ (2014) 1054; The Times of India ‘WTO package is to India's advantage 
and should receive broad political support’ (2013) Available at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/opinion/edit-page/WTO-
package-is-to-Indias-advantage-and-should-receive-broad-political-support/articleshow/27142204.cms (Accessed 29 April 2014); 
Willenbockel D ‘The WTO Bali Deal: ‘Doha Lite and Decaffeinated’ (2013) Available at 
http://www.globalisationanddevelopment.com/2013/12/the-wto-bali-deal-doha-lite-and.html (Accessed 11 May 2014). 
164 The acronyms TFA or TF will be used interchangeably. Trade facilitation (TF) looks at how procedures and controls governing the 
movement of goods across national borders can be improved to reduce associated cost burdens and maximise efficiency while 
safeguarding legitimate regulatory objectives. The Trade facilitation Agreement (TFA) on the other hand refers to that specific 
component of the Bali Accord that was negotiated in the Bali Summit in 2013 and that is legally binding between WTO Member 
States. 
165 Bellmann C ‘The Bali agreement: implications for development and the WTO’ (2014) 6; Kyo Suh J ‘The WTO Ministerial and 
Asian Integration: A Korean Perspective’ in Fukunaga Y, Riady J, and Sauvé P (eds) The Road to Bali: ERIA Perspectives on the 
WTO Ministerial and Asian Integration (2013) 39; Dube M Can the Bali Package Resolve the Doha Impasse and Secure the Future 
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Before discussing the TFA, it is noteworthy to understand the rationale behind negotiating such an 
agreement and its influence on countries. Over the last 30 years, governments around the globe have 
greatly reduced tariffs and removed quantitative restrictions on imports. Today, the international flow 
of goods, services and knowledge is mainly constrained by real trade costs, which reflect a 
combination of discriminatory policies that hinder the entry and operation of foreign firms in a given 
territory and regulatory policies that apply equally to local and foreign firms.166  
As a matter of fact, a report from the World Bank titled Doing Business indicated that it takes on 
average three times as many days, twice as many documents and six times as many signatures to trade 
in many African countries than in developed ones; and the costs of doing business in Africa are so 
substantial, to such an extent that every extra day it takes to get a shipment to its destination 
corresponds to a 1.5 per cent additional tax.167 
As such, TF aims at the simplification, modernisation and harmonisation of border trade 
procedures168 with respect to activities, practices and formalities involved in collecting, presenting, 
communicating and processing data and other requirements for cross-border movement of goods in 
order to ease trade flows.169 The final text of the TFA adopted in Bali is divided into two parts. Section 
I of the Agreement deals with substantive and procedural standards including availability of 
information, facilitated customs procedures such as advance ruling, pre-clearance and risk 
management, border cooperation, and dispute resolution. Section II deals with Special and 
Differential Treatment (S&DT) for DC and LDCs enumerating the type of technical assistance needed 
to ensure the implementation of new TF measures.170  
                                                                
166 Hoekman B The Bali Trade Facilitation Agreement and Rulemaking in the WTO: Milestone, Mistake or Mirage? (2014) 3. 
167 Djankov et al. ‘Trading on Time’ (2010) and Freund C & Rocha N ‘What constrains Africa's exports?’ (2011), quoted in Hoekman 
B The Bali Trade Facilitation Agreement and Rulemaking in the WTO: Milestone, Mistake or Mirage? (2014) 4. 
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‘From trade preferences to trade facilitation’ (2009) 12. 
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It is submitted that the benefits of TF will ensue to all Members, including LDC; since most of the 
measures deal with easing of customs procedures which hold potential to reduce trade costs, which 
is in itself a factor that still undermines the export competitiveness of LDCs.171 Even though, some 
specialists are denying such claims, arguing that the TF will mostly benefit the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries.172 Having said that, the economic gains 
from successful implementation of TF measures have been estimated to be quite significant. 
Estimates of the gains from a concluded WTO TFA varied dramatically, ranging from US$68 billion 
to $1 trillion, with some experts claiming that DCs stood the most to gain.173 
A recent study conducted by the OECD estimates that the implementation of all the TF measures is 
likely to decrease total trade costs by 10 per cent for developed countries and by 13 to15.5 per cent 
for DCs and LDCs and cutting global trade costs by just 1 per cent would increase worldwide income 
by over $40 billion, of which a staggering 65 per cent would accrue to DCs.174 
That being said, it is of utmost importance to mention that these estimates may be too high given that 
the trade effects of facilitation will depend on the trade potential that each country has. Hoekman 
believes that if there is significant trade potential, then countries would have greater incentives to 
invest in TF. The author clarifies that if Rwanda for instance were to try to emulate what has been 
achieved by Singapore, it would not necessarily realise the same level of trade performance achieved 
by Singapore.175 
The concept of TF is not new in the WTO. In fact, the WTO is all about facilitating trade. WTO 
Members put the topic of TF on the agenda of the Singapore MC in 1996, resulting in one of four so-
called Singapore issues.176 Working groups were formed to discuss the other three subjects, while TF 
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was addressed by the WTO Council for Trade in Goods given that the subject was already covered 
by WTO disciplines.177 At the time of the launch of the Doha Round in 2001, many countries did not 
believe that enough progress was made to agree on a negotiating agenda for these issues and decided 
to wait until the fifth Cancún MC in 2003 to determine whether and how to launch these issues.178 
When WTO Members regrouped in Geneva in July 2004, it was decided that the other three Singapore 
issues would be discarded and negotiations would only be launched on TF, as it proved impossible 
to agree on the other three subjects.179  
Renewing the mandate, the General Council decided on 1 August 2004 to begin talks. After the 
collapse of the entire Doha negotiations in 2008, a final text was ultimately adopted by consensus at 
the Bali meeting in 2013.180 However, on 31 July 2014, the WTO missed the deadline that was set in 
Bali for the adoption of a Protocol of Amendment of the TFA, causing another roadblock for the Bali 
Accord implementation and further uncertainty in the future of the multilateral trading system as a 
whole.181 India had decided to hold-out on ratification of the TFA, which froze discussions of the 
work program.182 On 27 November 2014 however, WTO Members ultimately adopted the Protocol 
of Amendment to insert the TFA into Annex 1A of the WTO Agreement.183 The TFA will enter into 
force once two thirds of the membership have completed their domestic ratification processes, and 
the WTO is hopeful that the ratification process be completed before the 11th MC in 2017. 
 
4.2.2.  Agriculture Agreement 
Over the years, agriculture negotiations have proven to be a major stumbling block and the most 
contentious issue in the way of forging consensus at Doha. Differences between the major 
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protagonists have effectively stalled the negotiations since 2008.184 In the run-up to Bali, agriculture 
had been identified as a priority area by two groups of DCs. Hence, the Bali outcome on agriculture 
focused on three distinct areas, namely export competition (export subsidies); Tariff Rate Quotas 
(TRQs) administration; and public stockholding for food security.185 
On the one hand, the G-33 was seeking amendments on the domestic support provisions in the 
Agreement on Agriculture (AoA). Its proposal for public stock-holding for food security purposes 
was raised at the informal meeting of the special session of the committee on agriculture in 2012. The 
deal was to a large extent shaped by India, through the determination of its negotiators to secure a 
meaningful package. It called for the provisions on public stockholding for food security purposes to 
be taken up for a formal decision at the Bali Summit.186 
Indian demands were the main cause of deadlock in the Bali MC and it was only after satisfactory 
terms on food security were established that India conceded to the agreement. The Bali Summit 
clearly mirrored previous attempts by India to renegotiate policy space in the WTO, demonstrating 
the continuity which underpins the diplomacy of emerging powers as they engage with the global 
trading system.187 
The G-20 of emerging economies188 on the other hand has proposed strengthening the export 
competition pillar. Its proposal deals with administering TRQs in agricultural trade. It looks at the 
way quotas for lower-duty volumes are allocated among importers. Some countries have expressed 
that the proposal on TRQ administration is essentially about balancing it with market access 
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provisions in the agriculture negotiations and have asked whether special treatment for DCs would 
leave major food importers as the main target of the proposal.189 
The TRQ discussion remained a rather technical issue and was eventually solved through an 
understanding on TRQ administration.190 The discussion on export subsidies on the other hand was 
dealt with through a political statement. WTO Members had already agreed in 2005 to eliminate 
export subsidies by 2013 as part of a broader Doha deal but this deadline had been missed because of 
the general impasse in the Round.191 The text also proposes improved information sharing and 
monitoring in order to support reform in this area.192 
 
4.2.3.  Least Developing Countries Agreement 
The LDC agreement was the most finalised of the three areas being prepared for approval in Bali. In 
May 2013, the LDC group had submitted a document outlining the issues it considered to be priority 
for agreement. The LDC agreement consists of three specific decisions namely, Duty-Free and Quota-
Free (DFQF) market access,193 preferential Rules of Origin (RoO) and the LDC services waiver.194 
A fourth decision on cotton is also of particular importance to the LDCs.195 
The first element of the LDC agreement is the establishment of a monitoring mechanism on Special 
and Differential Treatment (S&DT). This responds to Paragraph 44 of the 2001 Doha Ministerial 
Declaration which granted a mandate to review all S&DT provisions with a view to making them 
stronger, more precise, effective, and operational.196 As established in Bali, the mechanism will serve 
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as a focal point within the WTO for analysing and reviewing all aspects of the implementation of 
S&DT provisions.197 But it will not function as a negotiating forum. In cases in which the review 
identifies a problem, the mechanism may make recommendations to the relevant WTO body.198 
Another hard fought decision relates to the DFQF market access for the LDCs. It was inter alia 
decided that developed country Members that do not yet provide DFQF market access for at least 97 
per cent of products originating from LDCs, shall seek to improve their existing DFQF coverage for 
such products, so as to provide increasingly greater market access to LDCs, prior to the next MC.199 
The second element of the LDC agreement deals with RoO. The Bali MC marked an important step 
forward in the multilateral trading system by adopting the first ever set of multilateral guidelines on 
preferential RoO for LDCs. This was in response to a longstanding demand from the LDCs to make 
rules of origin associated with preference programmes simple and flexible, and commensurate with 
the level of their development. In the context of trade preference granted to LDCs, RoO define how 
much processing must take place locally before goods are considered to be of an LDC origin and 
therefore benefit from preferential treatment. In practice however, preferential RoO are often 
considered too restrictive and inflexible, making it difficult for LDCs to effectively take advantage 
of the intended preferences. 200 The Bali decision thus brings this issue under the umbrella of the 
WTO for the first time.201 
The third element of the LDC agreement deals with securing preferences for LDC services and service 
suppliers. This work stems from the Bali decision on LDC services waiver, which sets out a sequence 
of activities to help LDCs benefit from the waiver which was adopted in 2011.202 The adoption of the 
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waiver itself represented a breakthrough in 2011 in the context of the General Agreement on Trade 
in Services (GATS), where preferential market access treatment was previously not possible without 
such an instrument.203 
The fourth and last element of the LDC agreement deals with Cotton. Cotton has long been considered 
a symbol of the Development dimension of the Doha Round and has been high on the WTO’s agenda. 
Ever since 2003, when a group of West African countries known as the Cotton-4 or C4which include 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali, launched the Cotton initiative.204 At that time, the C4 countries 
accused the EU and the US of providing trade-distorting subsides to their farmers, depressing world 
prices and affecting poor producers in Africa who are unable to compete with Brussels and 
Washington treasuries.  
The C4 proposed that a Bali agreement should include the immediate elimination of export subsidies 
in the sector. Although the Bali agreement on Cotton aims at enhanced transparency and monitoring 
of trade-related aspects of Cotton and envisages for the first time the consideration of non-tariff 
measures applied to cotton exports from LDCs in markets of interest to them, the LDCs, in particular 
the C4, need to define their ambitions205 in the current phase of DDA negotiations.206 
 
4.3.  The influence of the Bali Conference on the Doha Round stalemate 
Before the resume of the multilateral talks in Geneva in 2006, then WTO head Lamy cautioned that 
‘were this Round to fail, DCs would pay the highest price […] the biggest loser, however, would 
undoubtedly be the WTO.’207 
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After years of stalemate, the Agreement reached at Bali injects a new life and vitality not only into 
the Doha negotiations, but also into the multilateral trading system. Although the Bali Agreement has 
brought a revitalising perspective into a stalled Round, it does not effectively address the DCs and 
LDCs interests and as such it has been criticised with reference to its impact within the WTO decision 
making process by some renowned specialists. The critics fall into two camps. There are those who 
see the WTO and its agreements as mechanisms dedicated to delivering solely for Western countries 
at the expense of poor people.208 Conversely, there are those who are so frustrated by the very slow 
pace of WTO talks to the extent that they are seeking to make bilateral deals such as the EU-US trade 
partnership.209  
The Bali Accord was also criticised by some development activists and eminent trade researchers 
who believe that it was not going far enough.210 Bhagwati and Willenbockel referred to the 
Agreement as ‘Doha lite and decaffeinated’,211 Bhagwati at al. labelled it as an ‘admittedly minor 
breakthrough’,212 Hoekman, Karmakar, Jatkar & Mukumba and Wolfe all described it as an ‘early 
harvest package’213 and Imboden called it ‘low-hanging fruits’;214 to highlight the extent to which 
ambitions had been lowered over twelve frustrating years of negotiating the Doha Round of trade 
consultations. 
Khor affirmed that the Bali Agreement needs to critically address the existing global trading system 
in order to make it ‘fairer and more effective’.  The reason is that DCs have attempted to reform the 
existing rules while developed countries have been making excessive demands on them in the Round; 
even though it was dubbed a Development Round, and are also preparing to propose new rules that 
would make the system more imbalanced.215  
Likewise, for development activist Tujan, the Bali Accord is essentially a step backwards for the 
WTO, as it claims to include not only the favoured issues of wealthy countries (like the TF) but also 
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the concerns of LDCs, instead of focussing exclusively on a much more innovative Development 
focussed Agenda that can rally the support of more DCs.216 He argues that the DDA, which was 
deceptively tagged as a Development Round, has pushed for agreements and rules on new issues217 
that many DCs and LDCs were not ready or willing to tackle, at the same times it urged these groups 
of countries to further open up their markets through elimination of tariffs and subsidies. The accord 
was supposed to end the Doha stalemate but instead continued to play this quid-pro-quo game of issue 
linkage.  
The straightforward criticism of the deal on the table at the start of the Summit by then Indian trade 
Minister Sharma reflected that particular sentiment that the Bali Accord does not address the 
fundamental issues of concern of DCs and LDCs when he asserted: 
‘We have a half-baked agricultural package, statements of pious intent for LDCs and 
several unresolved issues in the TFA […] None of these texts require the developed 
countries to make binding commitments for the benefit of DCs. In contrast, DCs and 
LDCs would be required to undertake significant commitments in TF. If this imbalance 
in the Bali Accord is not redressed, the world at large would accuse all of us of collectively 
making hollow promises and keeping the tank empty on Development content.’218 
Meanwhile, the completion of the Bali Summit has clearly exposed the pitfalls of the decision making 
system that is utilised in the Doha Round as well as within the WTO, mainly the single undertaking 
format, given the number of parties that partake in the discussions and the multiplicity of issues 
involved. As such, Dube submits that it is time to reassess the single undertaking in both the WTO 
and the Doha Round’s ambitions.219 
Notwithstanding the censure that the WTO and the Bali Accord came under, the LDC package itself 
has also been disapproved as well. Among its detractors is South African trade Minister Davies, who 
pointed out that: 
‘While the agreements reached at Bali are important, it is important to ensure balance in 
the agreements. We are of the view that there is a structural imbalance in which the LDCs 
secured only best endeavour solutions while there is a binding agreement on TF.’220 
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December 2013 Available at http://www.commondreams.org/view/2013/12/04-6 (Accessed 14 March 2014).  
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218 Narlikar A & Priyadarshi S ‘Empowering the poor? The successes and limitations of the Bali package for the LDCs’ (2014) 1056. 
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220 Narlikar A & Priyadarshi S ‘Empowering the poor? The successes and limitations of the Bali package for the LDCs’ (2014) 1056. 
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Similarly, Wilkinson et al. and Dube believe that the LDC package contains little of substantive value, 
as it is largely best-endeavour on the part of preference-granting countries. They claim that in the 
absence of legally binding commitments, LDCs will have to continue their fight to convince the 
industrial countries to fulfil their best endeavour promises made almost a decade ago when the Doha 
Round was launched.221 
The TF within the Bali Accord is also a source of disapproval, as it prolongs the pattern of 
asymmetrical powers witnessed in previous Rounds of WTO negotiations. According to Wilkinson 
et al., the politics that played out both before and during the Bali Summit revealed the emerging 
countries’ frustration with the stark imbalances that are likely to be exacerbated by the TFA and by 
the Bali Accord as a whole.222The benefits of the TFA remains a debatable issue, whether or not it 
will not ensue to all Members, particularly LDCs. The authors again suggest that although the poorest 
countries will certainly benefit from all three parts of the package somehow, the gains from TFA will 
accrue overwhelmingly to high-income economies instead.223  
In fact, many DCs and LDCs were concerned that the TFA would lock them into costly commitments, 
with little aid from development partners to implement them. Others feared that the TFA would only 
contribute to increasing imports, but do little to tackle supply-side constraints affecting exports. 
Finally, others insisted on the fact that the TFA should not distract the LDCs from their top priority 
reflected in the LDCs package.224 
Bellman on the other hand submitted that the TFA is probably the area of the Bali Accord that will 
generate the largest immediate benefits to poor countries, even though paradoxically most of them 
were not the main seeking party in this area.225 He argued that the most significant gains for LDCs in 
the TFA are likely to arise from a possible boost in intra-regional trade where a considerable growth 
potential remains untapped. 
As far as agriculture is concerned, its impact has also been questioned. Dube concedes that the entire 
Bali Accord lacks depth, except perhaps the TFA. The agriculture package does not attempt to address 
the issues preventing a broader agriculture deal in Doha and merely postpones negotiations on food 
stockholding to the 11th MC.226 Roy & Doerr suggest that the Accord has failed to address other 
                                                                
221 Dube M Can the Bali Package Resolve the Doha Impasse and Secure the Future of the WTO? (2014) 3; Wilkinson R, Hannah E 
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issues of utmost importance to DCs and LDCs such as promises made during the MC in Hong Kong 
in 2005 regarding the US’ Cotton subsidies and other export subsidies of industrialised countries.227 
In light of the aforesaid, it is clear that the recent breakthrough at the Bali Conference has been a 
breath of fresh air aimed at reinvigorating the stalled Doha Round. But what influence will the Bali 
Accord have on the multilateral trading system? How should the WTO capitalise on the Bali historical 
achievement in order to successfully conclude the Doha Round? These crucial questions will be 
elaborated in the forthcoming section. 
 
4.4. Life after Bali: the future of the WTO’s multilateral trading system 
In 2006, after the multilateral discussions subsequently broke down in Geneva, a number of observers 
lamented over the impact of the stalled Round on the WTO and the trade multilateralism more 
generally. Former GATT Director Sutherland claimed that ‘the collapse of the talks leaves the global 
multilateralism in a parlous state’ and that abandoning the Round would ultimately leave the WTO 
damaged.228 Likewise, the mass media also portrayed the inability to conclude the Round as the ‘final 
nail in the coffin’ for the organisation, aiming at the danger that ‘the entire multilateral trading system 
could now unravel’.229 
In 2012, former WTO head Lamy himself acknowledged that ‘multilateralism is struggling in almost 
all spheres of global co-operation’, and the lack of progress in the Doha Round ‘demonstrates that 
the WTO is not immune to the geo-economic and geo-political transformations of our time’.230 
After a decade of talks in the DDA marked by a slow pace in the negotiations, the Bali Agreement is 
perceived as a symbol of the spirit of compromise and political will that yielded the first multilateral 
trade agreement under the WTO. The Accord is credited to provide near-term results and hence is 
seen as a fresh and invigorating opportunity to reform the multilateral trading system and restore trust 
in the WTO.231 Apart from stimulating the WTO system, the agreement would also give a needed 
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boost to the world economy. It is also believed that the acceptance of the Bali Agreement could also 
help establish a meaningful post-Bali agenda, which may possibly kick-start the other contentious 
issues of the Doha Round that were not included in the package.232 
Meanwhile, Members have let the momentum from Bali languish; as they continue with the 
negotiation of mega-regional agreements to advance trade liberalisation outside of the WTO 
framework. These included the negotiation of large cross-regional schemes initiated by the US, such 
as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)233 and the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP);234 or plurilateral initiatives such as the Trade in Services Agreement (TISA),235 which is 
currently being negotiated by a group of leading countries representing roughly 70 per cent of the 
world's trade in services. 236  
Despite the gloomy prediction beforehand, the Bali Summit was a genuine success, concluding the 
most significant multilateral trade agreements since 1995. Yet, the other remaining issues of the DDA 
such as NAMA, trade in services and the outstanding agriculture topics will probably be the most 
critical and fundamental stumbling blocks going ahead.237 The challenge from the start of 2014 and 
beyond is to find a way to restructure other aspects of the Doha Round into an achievable package 
for the next MC in Kenya, in 2015.238 
 
4.5.  Conclusion 
Stricken by divergences, the DDA remained inconclusive for well over 13 years. Nevertheless, the 
successful adoption of the Bali Accord is a critical step forward. On the one hand, it has breathed a 
new life into the Round, retained and reinforced the promise of development as envisioned by the 
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DDA, and has bolstered the credibility of the multilateral system. On the other hand, it has also shown 
that the membership can deliver results for the LDCs.239 
While a compromise deal was reached in the Bali MC, concluding the Round successfully remains a 
demanding task as serious discrepancies exist between the developed and DCs on contentious issues 
such as market access and agricultural subsidies.240 The onus is on all the Members to ensure that the 
DDA closes successfully.  
All in all, the successful ratification of the Bali Accord in 2013 and the Protocol of Amendment to 
insert the TFA into the WTO Agreement in 2014 is a valuable evidence that the DDA has moved past 
its unflattering stalemate stage. Therefore, it does not seem accurate anymore to use expressions such 
as ‘deadlock’, ‘impasse’, ‘stalemate’ ‘standstill’ and so forth to qualify the Doha Round, as they do 
not truly reflect the status quo brought about by the unwavering political will that culminated with 
the first Agreement since the inception of the WTO in 1995. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUDING REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATION 
This final chapter, will present the conclusions and address some recommendations on how to make 
the decision making within the WTO more effective. 
 
5.1.  Concluding Remarks 
To conclude, this Research Paper endeavoured to evaluate whether the Bali Summit has successfully 
impacted on the Doha stalemate and the decision making pitfalls.  
The WTO governance has been relatively more successful in building a better decision making 
system and thus has been praised as compared to its Bretton Woods counterparts. As demonstrated 
in chapter two, section 2.3.1, consensus remains the most essential rule in the decision making process 
of the WTO. Nevertheless, its practical implications together with those associated with the single 
undertaking have also brought a number of obstacles that ultimately caused the current Round of 
negotiations to stall for many years. 
It was argued in chapter three, section 3.2.1 that while agreements within the WTO are based on 
consensus, attaining this is quite problematic as the negotiating mechanism within the WTO entails 
that each and every Member, irrespective of its political and socioeconomic influence must vote on a 
wide range of matters, and to make it more complex, each has the right of veto, which could at some 
point impede trade negotiations. 
Also evidenced in section 2.3.1, the slow pace in the Doha negotiations is likewise due to an altered 
geopolitical environment, caused by the rise of emerging economies in the field of world trade and 
complicated by the division between developed and emerging economies on the balance of 
concessions, all these have made consensus difficult to achieve. While a compromise deal was 
reached in the Bali MC, successfully concluding the DDA is a challenging task as the fundamental 
differences that exist between these two groups could further delay talks.  
As mentioned in section 3.2.3, although the single undertaking constitutes a protection against partial 
opt-outs in negotiated agreements, its practical implications that require all Members whether large 
or small, to undertake commitments and accept the whole and indivisible package are among the 
reasons of the Round’s previous impasse, as some LDCs face tremendous difficulties to put 
agreements into operation without everyone agreeing to move at the speed of the slowest Member, 
or without long and complicated negotiations between all Members, which would at some point 
impede negotiations. 
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As described in sections 3.2.2, 3.2.3 and 3.2.5, the DDA’s main shortcomings are the fact that it was 
designed with a wide and distinct agenda spanning nine negotiation areas. Combined with the single 
undertaking, which bundles all the issues under negotiation into a single indivisible package, together 
with the large size of the WTO membership, each with its various trade interests, all these make the 
decision making considerably complex and reaching agreements becomes challenging. 
As also explained in 3.2.4, the analysis of the Green Room processes within the WTO showed that in 
spite of the formally fair provisions, the informal procedures of decision making are problematic and 
breach the principle of transparency and equal participation of Member States. 
As evidenced in chapter four, the successful outcome in Bali has reignited interest in the Doha talks 
and has injected an invigorating perspective for both the WTO and the multilateral system. The Bali 
Accord symbolises a beacon of hope for LDCs who have witnessed a historic achievement as their 
issues of interest have been taken into account in multilateral discussions, albeit not effectively. The 
positive conclusion of the Bali Summit that culminated with the ratification of the Bali Accord in 
2013 and the Protocol of Amendment of the TFA in 2014 show that the DDA has moved past its 
stalemate phase and deserves not to be qualified with such pejorative terms. 
The WTO is facing numerous challenges in order to achieve the daunting task of liberalising trade. 
The successful conclusion of the DDA is undoubtedly a great step in this direction. However, it is not 
yet clear where the Doha discussions are headed on post-Bali. The operation of the Bali package 
could keep the momentum going on the Doha Round, provided that there is sufficient political will, 
leadership and creativity. Hence, it will be in the best interest of all the countries and the global 
economy to look beyond their differences and generate enough resolution to resolve the most 
contentious issues that would take the Round towards a successful completion. 
In order to make the decision making processes more flexible and effective, some recommendations 
will be presented in the ensuing section. 
 
5.2.  Recommendations 
In order for the decision making within the WTO more effective, consensus should be active, whereby 
Members have to state explicitly that they are in agreement, as opposed to silence, which could mean 
consent. 
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For transparency purposes within the WTO, there should be no place for informal meetings such as 
the Green Room. In other words, only decisions taken in formal meetings with the entire membership 
should be considered as legitimate. However, if the WTO does not want to do away with informal 
meetings, it should establish an informal steering committee (a consultative board) or a fully 
constituency based deliberative body where each constituency elects a representative that can be 
delegated responsibility in order to expedite consensus on trade issues among Member Countries. 
It is recommended that transcripts should be the preferred form of record keeping of meetings, which 
will ensure accuracy and transparency. There should also be a rationalisation of the WTO agenda. No 
more issues should be introduced whilst LDCs continue to participate in a disadvantaged position in 
terms of coming to terms with the issues and the resources to examine their implications. 
Additionally, Members should consider having a system of tiered voting. The use of the critical mass 
concept is seen as crucial in reforming the consensus and single undertaking principles and existing 
provisions in the WTO Agreement can be adapted for use in such concept. There should also be a 
parliamentary assembly to allow for a more democratic participation in WTO decision making. 
The WTO scored a notable victory at Bali. Members were able to renew the relevance of the 
multilateral trading system. Having reached an agreement on the ‘low-hanging fruits’, countries will 
now have to turn their attention into the more problematic issues that had previously been avoided. 
How Members choose to tackle and whether they will be able to arrive at a convergence on the 
remaining issues will determine whether the WTO negotiations agenda will be able to achieve another 
breakthrough in the future.  
It would therefore be useful for the membership to reflect on this lesson and set a pragmatic post-Bali 
agenda to build on the first success of the WTO in its 20-year history. One way to take negotiations 
forward post-Bali is for Members to attempt pursuing the negotiations of the remainder of the DDA 
as a set of mini-packages, similar to what was on agreed in Bali. In such a scenario, small positive 
gains for development are possible, provided there is enough political will and leadership. 
 
 
 
Final word count: 18 411 
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